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THE EVOLUTION OF THE "PATIENT": SHIFTS IN
ATTITUDES ABOUT CONSENT, GENETIC
INFORMATION, AND COMMERCIALIZATION IN
HEALTH CARE
Janet L. Dolgin *

1.

INTRODUCTION

A momentous ideological1 change in the world of health care has
accompanied the advent of managed care,2 third party payers, soaring
costs, 3 and sophisticated medical technology. 4 The ideological change
* Jack and Freda Dicker Distinguished Professor of Health Care Law, Hofstra University
School of Law. B.A., Barnard (philosophy), J.D., Yale, Ph.D., Princeton (anthropology). This
Article is dedicated to Hofstra Law's new dean, Aaron Twerski, who embodies the commandment
"Justice, justice shall you pursue." Deuteronomy 16:20.
I am grateful to Katherine R. Dieterich and Elizabeth Henries, both 2005 graduates of
Hofstra Law School, for assistance with research and to Cindie Leigh, Reference Librarian, Hofstra
Law School, for her insightful, intelligent, and generous help in identifying and locating research
materials.
1. "Ideology" and "ideological," as used here, do not refer to a system of political beliefs.
Rather, these terms refer to the essential assumptions (often unarticulated) through which a society
makes sense of itself and its world. This use follows that of the French anthropologist Louis
Dumont:
Our definition of ideology thus rests on a distinction that is not a distinction of matter but
one of point of view. We do not take as ideological what is left out when everything true,
rational, or scientific has been preempted. We take everything that is socially thought,
believed, acted upon, on the assumption that it is a living whole, the interrelatedness and
interdependence of whose parts would be blocked out by the a priori introduction of our
current dichotomies.
LouIs DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLE TO MARX 22 (1977).
2.

See STEPHEN M. AYRES, HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: THE FACTS AND THE

CHOICES 187-88 (1996).
3. See JOHN ABRAMSON, OVERDOSED AMERICA: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 76 (2004) (reporting that in the last two decades of the twentieth century, "[p]er-person
health care expenditures, adjusted for inflation, more than quadrupled"); REGINA E. HERZLINGER,
MARKET-DRIVEN

HEALTH CARE: WHO

WINS, WHO LOSES IN THE TRANSFORMATION

OF

AMERICA'S LARGEST SERVICE INDUSTRY xxi-xxiii, 225-26 (1997) (noting hospital interest in
expansion as method of attracting patients and physicians).
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has facilitated a far-reaching transformation in the physician-patient
relationship. A form of relationship grounded in hierarchy and trust5 has
been replaced by one grounded in the presumption that physician and
patient should relate to each other as autonomous individuals.6
This Article suggests that alongside the salutary consequences of
patient autonomy, 7 a set of troubling excesses has developed. The Article
4. Managed care, third-party payers, and the increasing commercialization of health care
have replaced the solo practitioner. General practitioners, making house calls and knowing patients
from birth until death have been replaced by specialists and sub-specialists. See PAUL STARR, THE
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 355-59 (1982). Hospitals compete for patients
in a commercial marketplace. HERZLINGER, supra note 3, at 225-26 (noting hospital interest in
expansion as method of attracting patients and physicians). Sophisticated machinery and
complicated medical tests have made the stethoscope practically obsolete. See LEWIS THOMAS, THE
YOUNGEST SCIENCE: NOTES OF A MEDICINE-WATCHER 57-60 (1983) (describing place of
computers and "complicated new technologies" in replacing clinical examinations that include
physicians touching patients and entering into dialogue with them).
5. The ideological change described in this Article is not unique to the world of health care.
Over two centuries ago, the marketplace of the Industrial Revolution was shaped by the
presumption of putatively equal, autonomous individuals, entering freely into bargains with other,
similar individuals. The same set of presumptions has been essential to the development of contract
law, and for about two centuries has served to distinguish the world of contract and commerce from
that of familial, religious, and personal relationships, and to some, though a lesser, extent, from
relationships between patients and physicians. See generally Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in
Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1994) (comparing
presumptions underlying Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) from those underlying both
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
6. Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp describe "[r]espect for autonomy" in their history of the
informed consent doctrine. See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY
OF INFORMED CONSENT 7 (1986). They write:
Respect for autonomy ... is conceived as a principle rooted in the liberal Western
tradition of the importance of individual freedom and choice, both for political life and
for personal development. "Autonomy" and "respect for autonomy" are terms loosely
associated with several ideas, such as privacy, voluntariness, self-mastery, choosing
freely, the freedom to choose, choosing one's own moral position, and accepting
responsibility for one's choices.
Id. In what they describe as a more "sustained analysis" of the term, Faden and Beauchamp explain
that autonomy depends on "intentionality," Id. at 7, 241; on understanding by the actor of an action,
Id. at 248; and on the actor's being "free of-that is, independent of, not governed by-controls on
the person, especially controls presented by others, that rob the person of self-directedness." Id. at
256.
The significance of safeguarding autonomy and individual rights within the world of health
care has become a central motif in bioethical discourse in the last three decades. ONORA O'NEILL,
AUTONOMY AND TRUST IN BIOETHICS 2 (2002) (noting that "no themes have become more central
in large parts of bioethics, and especially in medical ethics, than the importance of respecting
individual rights and individual autonomy").
Thus, the transformation of medical practice from cottage industry to big business has, not
surprisingly, been accompanied by momentous shifts in understandings of the various actors who
populate the world of health care. See AYRES, supranote 2, at 132.
7. See, e.g., JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE 14 (2d ed. 2001) (describing focus on "autonomy and concern for individual well-being"
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explores the parameters of those excesses. It argues that legal and social
stress on the importance of patient autonomy has sometimes facilitated a
set of worrisome consequences. Part II describes a set of structural and
economic changes that transformed the world of health care in the
United States, beginning in the last decades of the twentieth century.
Part III then reviews the genesis of patient autonomy and its implications
for understandings of the doctor-patient relationship. Part IV describes
three settings within which stress on patient autonomy, though generally
beneficial, has proved of questionable value or has proved openly
harmful to health care. The first setting, that of the development of the
informed consent doctrine, has resulted in what this Article refers to as
the elaborationof individualism. The second setting, that of rules about
the disclosure of genetic information, has resulted in what the Article
refers to as the perversion of individualism. The third setting, a
consumer marketplace in infertility treatment, differs somewhat from the
other two. It is not centrally concerned with information. Moreover, it
has largely developed in the absence, rather than through the
promulgation, of legal rules and regulations. The development of a
consumer market in infertility care has8 led to what this Article refers to
as the generalizationof individualism.

and the informed consent doctrine, undergirded by those values, as "cornerstone doctrine of
contemporary medical ethics and health law in the United States").
8. A disclaimer is in order. Although this Article, of necessity, refers to and describes
aspects of the broad transformation that has changed the nature of medical care in the United States
in the last several decades, it does not expressly delineate the implications of that general history
except insofar as it has affected the development of the ideological perspective this Article
considers in detail.
Beyond and beside the ideological shifts described in this Article is a myriad of political,
social and economic factors, both internal and external to the world of health care. These factors
have played a central role in transforming health care. See, e.g., STARR, supra note 3, at 8-9 (noting
that the transformation of American medicine has occurred within a much larger social and political
structure). These other factors are only addressed in this Article insofar as their development is
essential for understanding the ideological changes on which the Article focuses.
Among useful, scholarly works delineating the broader history of American medicine are
AYRES, supra note 2; HERZLINGER, supra note 4; SICKNESS AND HEALTH IN AMERICA: READINGS
IN THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Judith Walzer Leavitt & Ronald L. Numbers
eds., 3d ed. 1997); STARR, supranote 4.
Even more, the Article focuses on only certain aspects of one ideological change that has
reshaped understandings of physician and patient. Because the Article is concerned with describing
and analyzing practical and ideological excesses, it does not describe in detail the beneficial
consequences of a model for relationship that prizes autonomous individuality. Useful analyses that
present the salutary dimensions of having appropriated a model for action that values autonomous
individuality within the world of health care include: FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 6; ALBERT
R. JONSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS (1998).
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II. AUTONOMOUS INDIVIDUALITY WITHIN THE WORLD OF HEALTH

CARE

This Part summarizes a set of structural and economic changes in
the world of health care, beginning in the late twentieth century. It then
describes the ideological shifts on which the re-shaping of the doctorpatient relationship in the same years was premised.
A.

Background. Structuraland Economic Changes

Until the second half of the twentieth century, the practice of
medicine in the U.S. was a cottage industry. 9 Physicians typically
worked as sole practitioners or as members of small partnerships.' 0 Most
patients paid physicians directly for medical care."1 Although the image
of the physician-of-yesteryear as compassionate, caring healer is in some
part mythic,1 2 doctors typically made house calls, touched their patients
in the course of clinical examinations, 3 and entered into life-long
conversations with them.' 4 On the other side, the trust that defined the
physician-patient relationship was not always "reasonable trust."' 5 That
notwithstanding, the relationship between patients and physicians was
largely unmediated before the end of the twentieth century. 6 Paul Starr
explained:

9. See AYRES, supra note 2, at 132 (noting change during the second half of the twentieth
century from health care as "fee-for-service, solo-practice environment to one with increasing
penetration of large group practices that use a variety of managed care techniques to contain costs").
10. See id.
1I. See Kate Borten, Privacy in the Healthcare Industry, in INFORMATION SECURITY
MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 45,45 (Harold F. Tipton & Micki Krause eds., 5th ed. 2003).
12. See HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE: THE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING OF MEDICAL CARE 457 (1961)
(describing "popular conception of the doctor-patient relationship" as "a mixture of fact and
fancy").
13. See THOMAS, supra note 4, at 56-57 (noting the need of sick people to be touched and that
contemporary physicians can treat patients from "another building without ever seeing the patient"
due to computers and modem diagnostic testing).
14. See id.
at 59 (describing "talking with the patient" as the "biggest part of medicine" in the
early years of twentieth century).
15. O'NEILL, supra note 6, at 18 (critics of traditional doctor-patient relationship claimed
"patients who placed trust in their doctors were like children who initially must trust their parents
blindly").
16. The issue of health insurance first appeared in the United States at about the time of
World War I. See STARR, supra note 4, at 236. The appearance of the "Blues" (Blue Cross and Blue
Shield) in the 1920s was an important step in the growth of third-party payers. Id. at 295-98 (placing
"Birth of the Blues" between 1929 and 1945). After World War II, health insurance usually covered
hospitalization. Id. at 313.
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Prior to the rise of third parties, doctors stood in direct relation to their
patients as healers and benefactors. According to traditional ideals,
which are not entirely fictitious, doctors gave care according to the
ability to
needs of the sick and regulated fees according to the patients'
17
pay, which was, in effect, the doctors' ability to charge.
By the 1980s, only vestiges of that world survived. In his
comprehensive history of the "transformation" of American medicine
Starr asserted in 1982 that health care in the U.S. was "in the early stages
of a major transformation in its institutional structure" that could create
"an industry dominated by huge health care conglomerates."', 8 Many
factors were responsible for that transformation. These included the
skyrocketing costs of health care, 9 the diminishing promise of ever
more impressive medical care, 20 and the unmet health care needs of a
large segment of the population. 2' Partly in response to these factors, the
interest in regulatory control
government began to exercise far more
22
over health care in the United States.
American medicine, the consensus held, was overly specialized,
overbuilt and overbedded, and insufficiently attentive to the needs of
the poor in inner-city and rural areas. The system needed fewer
hospitals, more "primary" care, incentives to get doctors into
underserved communities, and better management and organization.
23
And most of all, Americans required national health insurance ....
In responding to the perceived crisis, the public and private sectors
voiced increasing support for health maintenance organizations
(HMOs).24 However, the HMOs that developed at this time differed
from the model constructed by Kaiser Permanente in the 1940s. That
model, as the phrase "health maintenance organization" suggests,

17.

Id. at 235-36.

18. Id. at 428.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See id at 379, 381-83.
See id.at 379.
Seeid. at382.
See id.379-80.

23. Id.at 382.
24. In early 1971, then-President Richard Nixon asked Congress to support the development
of health maintenance organizations (HMOs). See id. at 396. Starr asserts that the health care
industry attracted commercial investors after the creation of Medicare and Medicaid. These
programs, Starr suggests, made health care "lucrative." Id. at 428.
The HMO model was also taken up by the state governors in New York (Nelson
Rockefeller) and California (Ronald Reagan). See id at 396 (noting that in the 1970s, the
"conservative, cost minded critics of medical care" took up the HMO model that had previously
been seen as a product of "the cooperative movement" and as vaguely "subversive").
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focused on safeguarding health.25 The HMOs of the 1970s, focused not
on safeguarding health so much as on minimizing costs. 26 By the 1980s,

enrollment in health maintenance organizations had become the norm in
at least some states, 27 and by the 1990s, the American Medical
Association ceded its opposition28 to group practices and offered its
support for the concept of HMOs.
With the move to HMOs, 29 insurance companies and other thirdparty payers began increasingly to direct the practice of medicine,
including patients' choice of doctors.3 ° In all likelihood, HMOs were not
directly responsible for the weakening of the physician-patient
relationship. Yet, their development was facilitated by an earlier
transformation of that relationship 31 that resulted from a combination of
physician specialization (reducing the importance of contact between
patients and their doctors) and malpractice litigation. 32 In any event, by
the 1970s, the development of health maintenance organizations
significantly eroded trust and loyalty between physicians and patients.
B. Supportfrom ConstitutionalJurisprudence
Other changes, within and outside the world of health care,
facilitated the transformation of the relationship between patients and
physicians in the same years. Among these, a new focus in constitutional
jurisprudence in the last half of the twentieth century prepared the

25. See HERZLINGER, supra note 3, at 109.
26. See id
27. See AYRES, supra note 2, at 129. (noting that by the 1980s HMOs covered over 50% of
the population in places such as Minneapolis and Northern California).
28. See id.
29. As the HMO model proliferated, it began to replace indemnity insurance. See
HERZLINGER, supra note 3, at 129.
30. As people change jobs and as employers switch from one HMO to another, patients are
often compelled to change doctors (or to pay their own doctor bills). There have been many other
essential changes that have developed as a result of managed care. See, e.g., HERZLINGER, supra
note 3, at 110-27 (discussing effects of managed care). This Article focuses on the effects on
patients' abilities to choose their doctors because that matter is of importance to the character of the
relationship between doctors and patients.
31. See STARR, supra note 4, at 445. John C. Burnham similarly describes the transformation
away from the image of doctor-as-hero in the decades preceding the widespread appearance of
HMOs. See John C. Burnham, American Medicine's Golden Age: What Happened to It?, in
SICKNESS & HEALTH IN AMERICA, supra note 8, at 284. Burnham notes that, among other factors

reshaping the physician/patient relationship in the United States after World War II was the
"widespread anti-institutional sentiment along with a general disillusionment with many aspects of
American life." Id. at 287.
32. STARR, supra note 4, at 445.
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ground on which the physician-patient relationship was redefined by
courts and legislatures.
Brown v. Board of Education33 symbolizes, perhaps more than any
other case, the flowering of a jurisprudence committed to the protection
of individual rights. Brown was grounded in the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment,3 4 but it foreshadowed later cases that relied on a less
specific set of constitutional referents to extend constitutional protection
to individuals within other, especially familial, settings.35 Many of the
legal cases that recognized the right of family members to autonomous
choice concerned reproductive liberties.36 These cases therefore
implicated matters of health care as well as the place of individuals
within families. The cases suggested, albeit implicitly, that individual
patients were entitled to constitutional protection just as individual
family members were so entitled.3 7 The message of these decisions
harmonized with the notion being developed at about the same time by

33. See 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment declares:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating state birth control
law through reference to constitutional penumbras that defined a right to privacy). In Griswold, the
Court explained that "[v]arious guarantees create zones of privacy." Id. at 484. The Court then
located these "zones of privacy":
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we
have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in
any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that
privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The
Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
Id. at 484.
36. See id
37. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (describing
constitutional protection for dying individuals and upholding a Missouri statute that required clear
and convincing evidence of patient wishes in the case of a woman in a persistent vegetative state,
and noting "liberty interest in refusing medical treatment").
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lawmakers and bioethicists, 38 that patient autonomy deserves respect in
clinical and experimental settings.39
C. The Groundfor New Guidelines. ChangingIdeological
Presumptions
Other currents merged with the structural and economic shifts in the
world of health care, 40 and with the development of a constitutional
jurisprudence protecting individualrights, 4' to reinforce the significance
of patient autonomy. Central among these currents was the appearance
of bioethics 42 as a field of practical and academic inquiry, beginning in
the 1960s. 43 Scholars, lawyers, physicians, and others, defining
themselves as bioethicists, have played a key role in framing the
autonomy of patients and research subjects as crucial to the morality of
health care and biomedical research.44 In these contexts, autonomy is
generally understood to include some aspect of liberty, dignity,
individuality, independence, privacy, voluntariness, and free choice.4 5

38. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (noting development of bioethics as a field
of study).
39. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
40. See supra notes 9, 18-19 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
42. Bioethics is defined as "the systematic study of the moral dimensions-including moral
vision, decisions, conduct and policies-of the life sciences and health care, employing a variety of
ethical methodologies in an interdisciplinary setting." JONSEN, supra note 8, at vii (citing WARREN
T. REICH, Introductionto THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS xxi (rev. ed. 1995)).
There is some debate about when the term "bioethics" was first used, but at least by the
early 1970s, it had appeared. The Kennedy Institute, founded in 1971, was named The Joseph and
Rose Kennedy Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction and Bioethics. See O'NEIL, supra
note 6, at 1. (citing W.T. Reich, The Word 'Bioethics': Its Birth and the Legacies of Those Who
Shaped It, 4 KENNEDY INSTIT. ETHICS J. 319 (1994)).

Although bioethics may well be more a "meeting ground" for dialogue than a full-fledged
academic discipline as the British philosopher Onora O'Neill has claimed, "bioethicists" have
gained increasing clout and prestige in the last several decades. Id.
43. See JONSEN, supra note 8, at vii.
44. At one of the first "Bioethics" conferences, held at Reed College in Oregon in 1966 (and
called "The Sanctity of Life"), Professor Abraham Kaplafi, a philosopher from UCLA summarized
the conference proceedings:
The moral judgment must accord with the principle of moral autonomy, as it has been
known in philosophy since Immanuel Kant. The moral will must be a lawgiver unto
itself; . . . in that case, we are committed to respecting the moral autonomy of other
moral agents as well.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added) (describing Kaplan's summary to have "presaged a dominant principle of
future bioethics").
45. The list was compiled by O'Neill. She relied in part on Gerald Dworkin, who noted that
autonomy has been equated with:
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Bioethical theory began to coalesce in the years after World War II
in response to the horrific abuses committed by Nazi doctors.46 Later,
other revelations about the abuse of human subjects in the U.S.,
motivated bioethicists and lawmakers to fashion guidelines for the
protection of research subjects.47 Central to these responses was broad
support for safeguarding individual autonomy in clinical and
experimental settings.
This Part reviews this history. It also considers the somewhat
different, though not unrelated, appearance of patient autonomy in the
marketplace of late twentieth century health care, a phenomenon also
facilitated by the growing significance of patient autonomy. The creation
of a consumer market in infertility care provides a powerful illustration.
A review of both sets of developments, the construction of guidelines
ensuring patient autonomy and the development of the patient-asconsumer, is a necessary prerequisite to the discussion in the next Part of
the Article of three kinds of ideological excesses that have accompanied
the increasing stress on individual autonomy in the world of health care.
A.

The Development and Elaborationof Individualism: The Informed
ConsentExample

This Section reviews the development of the informed consent
doctrine in the United States. It provides background for the discussion
in the next Part of the elaboration and perversion of the doctrine.
The informed consent doctrine developed from two strands of
ethical concern, one for protection of human subjects of experimental
research, the other for protection of patients in clinical settings.4 8 These

Liberty (positive or negative)... dignity, integrity, individuality, independence,
responsibility and self-knowledge .... self-assertion .... critical reflection.., freedom
from obligation ... absence of external causation.., and knowledge of one's own
interests.
O'NEILL, supra note 6, at 21 (citing GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
AUTONOMY 6 (1988); Gerald Dworkin, The Concept ofAutonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL 54 (John

Christman, ed. 1989)) (alteration in original). She also relied on Ruth Faden and Thomas
Beauchamp who noted that autonomy has been linked with: "privacy, voluntariness, self-mastery,
choosing freely, choosing one's own moral position and accepting responsibility for one's choices."
O'NEILL, supra note 6, at 22 (citing FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supranote 6).
46. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
48. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 6, at 151.
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two strands in the development of the notion of informed consent are
considered, respectively.
1. Development of the Informed Consent Doctrine in the Context
of Research Involving Human Subjects
In both research and clinical settings, development of the informed
consent doctrine rested on a broad cultural shift that provided for
recognition of the autonomous research subject and for the autonomous
patient. The informed consent requirement appeared in research settings
a few years before it was applied in clinical settings.49 In research
settings, the doctrine was constructed in express response to the
revelation of abuses of human subjects by researchers. The deliberations
that followed led to construction of the informed consent doctrine and to
the institutionalization of "bioethics" as an area of study and practice.
One theorist referred to the discourse about experimentation that
of human subjects of research
surrounded the revelation of such abuses
50
as the "defining moment for bioethics."

More specifically, the informed consent requirement emerged as
the most important concretization of the realization that it is essential as
a matter of morality to safeguard the autonomy of human research
subjects. As lawyers, doctors, church representatives, and philosophers,
faced with horrors such as those committed by Nazi doctors, balanced
respect
the "social good" of human experimentation against increasing
51
for individual autonomy, the later principle emerged the victor.
One of the most consequential statements about the ethical
principles that should govern research involving human subjects
emerged from the deliberations of the judges that tried Nazi doctors and
53
The trial, referred to as
researchers 52 at Nuremberg after World War II.

49.

See, e.g., id. at 151-99 (summarizing the history of informed consent rules in the context

of human subject research).
50. Al Jonsen Produces Sourcebook and History of Bioethics, U. WK., July 23, 1998,
availableat http://depts.washington.edu/-uweek/archives/1998.07.JUL_23/articlel 4.html.
51. JONSEN, supranote 8,at 334-35. Dr. Jay Katz, noting the need to respect the autonomy of

human subjects of biomedical research, explained that society has been "all too willing, in our
longing to conquer disease and death, 'to possess the end and yet not be responsible for the means,
to grasp the fruit while disavowing the tree, to escape being told the cost, until someone else has
paid it irrevocably."' Jay Katz, Human Experimentation andHumanRights, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 7,
39 (1994) (quoting Edmond Cahn, Drug Experiments and the Public Conscience, in DRUGS 1N OUR
SOCIETY 255, 260 (Paul Taladay ed., Johns Hopkins Press 1988) (1964)).
52. The experiments done by the Nazi doctors who were tried at Nuremberg (charged with

"murder, tortures and other atrocities committed in the name of medical science") included forced
sterilization that involved exposing the gonads of concentration camp inmates to radiation, longterm exposure of inmates to freezing temperatures and low air pressure in order to study the process
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the Nazi Doctors Trial,54 resulted in the conviction of fifteen Nazi
doctors. The opinion of the Nuremberg court included a broad
assessment of basic moral obligations owed by researchers to human
subjects of research. This assessment, referred to as the Nuremberg
Code, 55 delineated basic moral principles to guide those engaged in
research and experimental work with human subjects. Among other
things, these principles require subject consent to participation in
research and require researchers to focus on avoiding harm to research
subjects.56 The first principle delineated by the court at Nuremberg
predicates ethical research on the researcher's having received "[t]he
voluntary consent of the human subject. 5 7 The judges explained the
principle to require:
that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent;
should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice,
without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress,
over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and
should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements
of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an
understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires
that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the
experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature,
duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by
which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably

of their deaths, and exposure of inmates to deadly pathogens so that the course of the resulting
disease and death could be detailed by the researchers. BERG, supra note 7, at 250. Some other
experiments done by Nazi doctors involved burning prisoners to study treatments for scarring,
experiments involving grafting of bone and muscle, experiments with gases and burning fluids,
sexual surgery and electroshock. See Document F321, For the International War Council at
Nuremberg ("Das Licht"), http://www.technologyartist.com/concentrationcamp/index.html
(last
visited Oct. 15, 2005).
53. See KENNETH GETZ & DEBORAH BORFITZ, INFORMED CONSENT: THE CONSUMER'S
GUIDE TO THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF VOLUNTEERING FOR CLINICAL TRIALS 98-101 (2002). See
generally THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE (George Annas & Michael Grodin eds.,

1992).
54. See GETZ & BORFITZ, supra note 53, at 99.
55.

THE

NUREMBERG

CODE

(1949),

http://www.ushmm.org/research/doctors

/NurembergCode.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2005) [hereinafter NUREMBERG CODE].
56. The Code begins by declaring that "[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is
absolutely essential." Id.
The Code was never officially adopted by the community of international lawmakers. See
Shannon Benbow, Note, Conflict & Interest: FinancialIncentives and Informed Consent in Human
Subject Research, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 181, 186 (2003).
57.

NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 55.
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to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person
which may
58
possibly come from his participation in the experiment.

The Nuremberg Code provided a useful model for U.S. lawmakers
in the 1960s and 1970s, when they fashioned a response to revelations
about abuses of human subjects in research settings in the U.S. The most
well-known of these abuses, 59 known as the Tuskegee study, involved a
long-term study of syphilis conducted by the U.S. Public Health Service
on poor African-American men. 60 The subjects were deprived of
information about the character of their illness, and more startlingly,
were deprived of antibiotic treatment when it became available.6' Media
reports in 1972 on the history of the study led to the government's
establishing a panel (Tuskegee Syphilis Study Ad Hoc Panel),
62
commissioned to report on the study's moral and social implications.
In the aftermath of revelation of the study and after the appearance
of the panel's Report, Congress passed the National Research Act of
1974.63 The Act established the National Commission for the Protection
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.64 The
Commission was given the task of constructing principles for assessing
the morality of human subject research. In 1979, the group presented a

58. Id. In the United States, this principle has been important to theoretical deliberations about
the morality of human subject research. It has, however, not generally been followed in practice,
largely because it would preclude research involving children and others incapable of giving
consent. MICHAEL H. SHAPIRO ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON BIOETHICS AND LAW
200 (2d ed. 2003). See generally DAVID ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF
How LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (1991).

59. Other abuses of human subjects of research in the United States included those revealed
by Dr. Henry Beecher in a 1966 article in the New England Journalof Medicine. Beecher detailed
twenty-two (of fifty) studies involving human subjects in the United States that involved
unacceptable risks or other violations of ethics. See Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical
Research, 274 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966). Another set of revelations become public in 1986
with the release of a congressional subcommittee report (called "'AmericanNuclear Guinea Pigs"
and prepared for the House Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power). This report
described unethical experiments on hundreds of people, carried out under the auspices of the federal
government. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, SOME CHOICE: LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE MARKET 157-60
(1998).
60. See, e.g., JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD, THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 1-2
(1981) (describing study of 400 African-American men run by the United States Public Health
Service, involving observation, but not treatment, of men with syphilis over a forty year period).
61. See JONSEN, supra note 8, at 146-48.
62. See id.at 148 (finding the study to have been immoral from the start and calling for the
study's immediate end and for compensation to surviving victims of the study).
63. See National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342
(1974).
64. See id
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Report-referred to as The Belmont Report. 65 The Report detailed three
"basic" ethical principles: "respect for persons, beneficence, and
justice. ,,66 The fr
first of these principles focused expressly on the
significance of safeguarding individual autonomy. The "autonomous
person," the Report explained, is one "capable of deliberation about
67
personal goals and of acting under the direction of such deliberation.,
"Respect for persons" was accordingly described as requiring "that
individuals should be treated as autonomous agents," and that protection
should be extended to "persons with diminished autonomy. '68 The
Report further explained that in the research context, the concretization
of respect for capable persons could be achieved through the
institutionalization of the informed consent requirement.6 9
The Belmont Report served as more than a compilation of
guidelines for researchers. As Albert Jonsen, one of the commissioners
who created the Report, explained, the three "ethical principles"
described in the Report have come to define not only the obligations of
researchers to research subjects but the whole of contemporary
bioethics.7 °
During more or less the same period that informed consent was
being defined as one of the prerequisites of ethical research involving
human subjects, the same notion was being shaped by courts and
legislatures for application in clinical practice. As a result, lawmakers
challenged the ancient Hippocratic precept ("do no harm") which often
expressly precluded revelations from physicians to patients, and they
challenged the much broader tradition of paternalistic care for patients to
which physicians had been committed for many, many centuries. 7 1 In
short, institutionalization of the informed consent requirement in
65. See THE NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, (DHEW PUBLICATION NO. (OS) 78-0012) (1979).

66. ld. at 4.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id. at 4-5. The report defined beneficence as the obligation to "do [no] harm," and beyond
that, to "maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms." It defined justice as an ethical
matter addressed through fair answers to the following question: "Who ought to receive the benefits
of research and bear its burdens?" Id. at 6, 8.
69. See id.
The report explained that consent should be sought also from persons with limited
capacity to understand, and that third parties should provide additional consent before such persons
("infants and young children, mentally disabled patients, the terminally ill and the comatose")
should be permitted to participate in research. Id. at 13.
70. See JONSEN, supra note 8, at 103-04 (noting that the three ethical principles "grew from
the principles underlying the conduct of research into the basic principles of bioethics").
71. See William J. McNichols, Informed Consent Liability in a "Material
Information "Jurisdiction:What does the FuturePortend?, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 711, 715-16 (1995).
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application to clinic practice facilitated a dramatic reconstruction of the
patient-physician relationship.
2.

Development of the Informed Consent Doctrine in the Context
of Clinical Care
By the middle decades of the twentieth century, patient autonomy
began openly to replace physician authority as the central value by
which society and the law judged the moral dimensions of relationships
within the world of clinical health care as well as within the world of
research and experimentation. 72 Development of the informed consent
doctrine constitutes one of the central manifestations of this process.
For many centuries, English common law had frowned upon
doctors treating patients who had not consented to treatment. 73 In the
United States, the law's requiring patient consent prerequisite to
patients' receiving health care dates back to the early twentieth century.
The consent requirement was the central message of then-Judge
Cardozo's famous pronouncement in Schloendorff v. N.Y. Hospital that
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent, commits an assault,
for which he is liable in damages." 74 Cardozo thus concluded that a
physician who treated a patient without her knowledge, and thus without
her consent, had committed a legal wrong.
Cardozo's decision in Schloendorff though clearly confirming a
prohibition against treatment without consent, says nothing about
providing patients with information about the implications of medical
72.

See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text; see also infra note 99 and accompanying

73.

See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS § 9 (5th ed. 1984).

text.
74. See Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). Almost a decade
before Schloendorff, the Minnesota supreme court suggested the outlines of an informed consent
rule in Mohr v. Williams. See 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905). The plaintiff had agreed to surgery on her
right ear. Instead, the surgeon operated on her left ear (which he had determined was diseased). The
case was brought under an assault and battery theory. The court concluded that the surgery, absent
the patient's consent was unlawful. Judge Brown explained:
There is logic in the principle thus stated, for, in all other trades, professions, or
occupations, contracts are entered into by the mutual agreement of the interested parties,
and are required to be performed in accordance with their letter and spirit. No reason
occurs to us why the same rule should not apply between physician and patient. If the
physician advises his patient to submit to a particular operation, and the patient weighs
the dangers and risks incident to its performance, and finally consents, he thereby, in
effect, enters into a contract authorizing his physician to operate to the extent of the
consent given, but no further.
Mohr, 104 N.W. at 15.
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conditions from which they suffer or information about the nature and
scope of proposed diagnostic or treatment responses. 75 The doctrine
establishing that consent should be premised on information provided to
the patient took shape almost a half century after Schloendorff, and has
since been expanded and elaborated so as 76significantly to alter the
character of the physician-patient relationship.
In the years following Schloendorff a variety of social and
economic trends, including, in particular, the broad generalization of
individualism within United States society after World War II, the
development of expensive medical technology, new modes of access to
information, articulation of an informed consent rule for application to
research contexts, and the broad commercialization of health care,
encouraged the widespread acceptance and expansion of the informed
consent doctrine in clinical settings. This subsection will review the
most straightforward aspects of the evolution of
the informed consent
77
doctrine in the decades following World War II.

Within judicial arenas, the notion that consent must be predicated
on information was first enunciated expressly, and the term "informed
consent" 78 was first used, in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University,
decided by the California First District Court of Appeals in 1957.79
Martin Salgo, the plaintiff, was left paralyzed after he underwent a nowobsolete procedure, a translumbar aortography 8 0 The court explained
that "[a] physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to
liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis
'
of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment."'
However, the Salgo court, apparently uncomfortable with a sweeping
rule demanding information as a prerequisite to consent, also stressed
the physician's "discretion" to withhold information, "consistent, of
course, with
the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed
82
consent.,

Salgo thus represents an effort to amalgamate a new understanding
of the physician-patient relationship with a traditional one. That effort
was limited from the start by an inherent conflict between those two
75.

See Schloendorf 105 N.E. at 92-95.

76. See infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
77. See generally infra Part IV (discussing elaboration and perversion of the doctrine).
78. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
79. See id. at 170.

80. The procedure involved puncturing the aorta from the rear and injecting a radio-opaque
dye so that the aorta could be studied. See BERG, supra note 7, at 44.
81. Salgo,317P2datl8l.
82. Id.
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understandings. The first depends on the primacy of autonomous
individuality; the second depends on the primacy of community and
provides for hierarchy and paternalism, manifest in the figure of
physician as decisor. Dr. Jay Katz has described Salgo as a fanciful
attempt to render consistent two irreconcilable visions of the physicianpatient relationship and two irreconcilable obligations of the physician. 3
Even more, Salgo, and the informed consent cases that followed it,
reflect a transition from one understanding of personhood and
community to a second, contrasting understanding.
In the next several years, the developing informed-consent doctrine
was reinforced by a couple of judicial decisions that clearly required that
a patient's consent be premised on information about the risks of
recommended care.8 4 Then, a decade and a half after Salgo, a federal
court in Washington, D.C. presented a significantly broader
interpretation
of the emerging informed consent doctrine in Canterbury
85
v. Spence.
The case was initiated by Jerry Canterbury, who sued Dr. William
Spence after surgery performed by Dr. Spence left Canterbury (then age
nineteen) with a variety of permanent disabilities.86 Before Canterbury,
courts judged a physician's failure to disclose necessary information to a
patient by rules forged in the context of malpractice litigation. Those
rules looked to standard practice within the profession in order to assess
a particular physician's failure to disclose. 87 In Canterbury, the court
rejected that practice and concluded, instead, that assessment of the
physician's failure to disclose would be judged with reference to the
information that a reasonably prudent person would find "material" in
deciding whether to consent to proposed treatment(s).88
The rule articulated in Canterbury broadly redefined the character
of the physician-patient relationship. Indeed, that re-definition has likely
been more consequential than, and was certainly not unrelated to, the
decision's deep bow to patient autonomy in specific reference to

83.

See Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137,

(1977).
84. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960) (finding
consented to radiation therapy but was not adequately informed about risk of
therapy); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 14-24 (Mo. 1960) (concluding
consented to insulin shock and electroshock treatments but was not adequately
risks).
85.
86.
87.
88.

that the patient
bums from the
that the patient
informed about

See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
See id. at 777-78.
See id. at 783.
Id. at 784, 786-87.
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informed consent.89 Patient autonomy is less well served by the informed
consent rule than is generally assumed. In part, this is because many
patients (including those who are young, very sick, unconscious, or
mentally challenged) are not fully autonomous. 90 In addition, competent
patients, even when provided with adequate information, are often
offered little more, as a practical matter, than an opportunity to choose or
to reject recommended treatment. 9' Most patients remember
comparatively little of what is communicated to them during pre-consent
discussions with their physicians.92 Finally, health care workers'
descriptions of proposed treatments almost always differ from patients'
actual experiencing of the treatment.93
In Onora O'Neill's term, consent is "opaque." 94 She explains:
In [one] case I might consent to a medical procedure described in
euphemistic and unthreatening ways, yet not see myself as consenting
to another more forthright and equivalent description of that very
treatment. In [a] second case I might consent to chemotherapy, and yet
when as a result I fell desperately ill and weak may truthfully claim
that I never consented to anything that would have this effect, even if
these very effects95were carefully described as among the normal effects
of the treatment.

For the most part, physicians are not expected, indeed they are no
longer legally permitted, to effect choices about a patient's health care

89. The Canterbury "reasonable person" standard remains the minority position among the
states. Most states rely on the so-called "professional" malpractice standard in considering cases
alleging a health care worker's failure to disclose. MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND

ETHics 201 (6th ed. 2003); see, e.g., Culbertson v. Memitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 103-04 (Ind. 1992)
(relying on the professional malpractice standard and noting that the Code of Medical Ethics of the
American Medical Association requires physician "to present the medical facts accurately to the
patient").
90. See Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predatorsand the Structure of the Mental Health System:
Expanding the Normative Focus of Therapeutic Jurisprudence,1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 161,
174 (1995); Michelle Oberman & Joel Frader, Dying Children and Medical Research: Access to
Clinical Trialsas Benefit andBurden, 29 AM. J.L. MED. 301, 314 (2003).
91. See Susan Adler Channick, The Myth of Autonomy at the End-of-Life: Questioning the
Paradigm of Rights, 44 VILL. L. REV. 577,624 (1999).

92. Alan Meisel & Loren H. Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent: A
Review and Critique of the Empirical Studies, 25 ARIZ. L. REv. 265, 292-95 (1983) (reporting a
study revealing that patients remembered significantly less than half of what was told to them
during informed consent interviews, and reporting other studies revealing that only sixty percent of
patients about to undertake chemotherapy reported correctly what the therapy entailed despite
having sat through informed consent interviews).
93. O'NEILL, supra note 6, at 38, 43.
94. Id. at 43.
95. Id. at 43-44.
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absent the informed consent of the patient. 96 Yet, patients are often not
anxious or able to interpret medical data and participate actively in
decision-making about health care. 97
Canterbury and other decisions that have reinforced the physician
obligation to disclose information about health care options 98 do not
focus on diminishing physician authority and power even though that
has been one consequence of the disclosure requirement they have
defined. But a number of later judicial decisions that have dramatically
augmented the scope of the informed consent doctrine, have focused
almost explicitly on restricting physician authority and power in the
context of the physician-patient relationship. 99 A few of those cases,1°°
those that most obviously limit physician authority in that they require
physicians to reveal information about their own limitations, are
considered in Part IV.' 01
B.

The Autonomous Patientin the Marketplace

The first Section of this Part provided background for the
discussion in Part IV of the elaboration and perversion of the
autonomous individuality in the world of health care. This Section
provides background for the discussion in Part IV of the third excess, the
generalization of autonomous individuality in the world of health care.

96. There are a few widely recognized exceptions to the informed consent requirement. For
instance, patient consent is not required in an emergency situation that involves a patient unable to
provide informed consent. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In addition,
the disclosure obligation is waived if the physician believes that disclosure would present a "threat
of detriment to the patient as to become unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of
view." Id. at 789. This is the so-called "therapeutic" exception to the informed consent doctrine.
97. O'NEILL, supra note 6, at 28-48 (considering limitations of "informed consent" with
regard to autonomy); Alan Meisel & Loren H. Roth, supra note 92, at 326 (referring to a study
showing that most patients do not want to remain completely passive in the face of medical
decisions but they do not want to bear full responsibility for their own medical decisions).
98. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (holding physician to duty of
reasonable disclosure).
99. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
100. A variety of cases has extended the reach of the informed consent doctrine in other ways.
For instance, in Truman v. Thomas, the Supreme Court of California obliged a physician to inform a
patient about the risks of not agreeing to a suggested diagnostic test (in that case, a pap smear). The
Truman court rejected the physician's argument that, "since a physician's advice may be presumed
to be founded on an expert appraisal of the patient's medical needs, no reasonable patient would fail
to undertake further inquiry before rejecting such advice." 611 P.2d 902, 906 (Cal. 1980); see also
Conservatorship of Waltz, 227 Cal. Rptr 436, 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the "mere fact
Waltz has been diagnosed as having a mental illness is not enough to deem him incapable of
consent").
101. SeeinfraPartIV.
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02
The creation of a consumer marketplace for the treatment of infertility
will illustrate this third excess.
New understandings of patient and physician as putatively equal,
autonomous partners support the appearance of forms of relationship and
modes of decision making within the world of health care that resemble
those in the commercial marketplace. Traditionally, the practice of
medicine in the United States entailed a peculiar dichotomy. Medicine
presented itself as a profession that ensured loyalty and justified trust.
Yet, the practice of medicine has almost always been a business. 10 3 At
one end, the practice of medicine entailed financial relationships and
constraints. At the other end, neither doctors nor patients traditionally
viewed themselves primarily as participants in a commercial
marketplace. Rather, their relationships assumed physician authority,
patient trust, and loyalty of each to the other. Those assumptions were
grounded in social understandings of the physician-as-professional.
George Lundberg, former editor of the Journalof the American Medical
Association, relies on the metaphor of a rocking horse to describe a
recent shift toward the business end of the continuum:

[T]he balance between business and professional values has tipped
dangerously toward the business side. [Writing in 1990,] 1 expressed
this in a bell-shaped top and rocking-horse bottom, with moneygrubbers and altruistic missionaries at opposite ends of the curve and
businesspeople and professionals in the larger central portion of the
curve ....
Unfortunately, we have always had money-grubbers, and probably
always will. More alarming, however, has been the shift in the middle
tilting physicians toward the business side .... My concern is that, if
the rocking horse rocks too far toward the business side, it may tip
over and the profession
of medicine may be lost; all trust and respect
04
disappear.1
will

102. Other examples might have been considered instead. Among them is the changing
relationship between pharmaceutical companies and patients. In particular, pharmaceutical
companies increasingly rely on direct-to-consumer advertising to sell drugs, thus encouraging
patients to ask their physicians for prescriptions for particular drugs. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Melby,
The Psychological Manipulationof the Consumer-PatientPopulation Through Direct-to-Consumer

PrescriptionDrug Advertising, 5 SCHOLAR 325 (2003); Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Promotion of
PrescriptionDrugs to Consumers,346 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 498, 499-501 (2002).
103. See GEORGE D. LUNDBERG, SEVERED TRUST: WHY AMERICAN MEDICINE HASN'T BEEN
FIXED 156 (2000).

104. Id. at 164.
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Lundberg wonders whether medicine may completely lose its
professional persona during the course of the next decade and "become
unequivocally dominated by business interests."' 10 5 If that happens, he
concludes, patients and physicians will grow further apart. One
consequence may be an increasingly strong interest among patients in
alternative forms of medical practice. 0 6 This possibility suggests the
increasingly competitive character of the business of medicine for
physicians.
Generally, however, even as the world of health care tilts toward
the world of commerce, a number of factors, including especially, the
presence of third-party payers, continues to distinguish the marketplace
in health care from the larger commercial marketplace. 10 7 Moreover,
patients do continue to respect their physicians and to accept their advice
more trustingly than they accept advice from merchants. There are,
however, a few areas of medical practice in which the process of
commercialization has been especially overt. These have been, on the
whole, areas that mostly operate without the mediation of third-party
payers. The construction of a market in care for infertility is
illustrative. 108

105. Id at 165.
106. Id.
107. William White reviews several aspects that distinguish the health care industry from
others:
The health care industry has several important features that have combined to create a
unique regulatory environment. First, the industry is characterized by major problems
with uncertainty. Second, there are widely shared equity concerns. Third, the industry
has been very dynamic; accompanied by rapid technological change, health care
spending has been on a sharply rising trajectory since the early twentieth century.
William D. White, Market Forces, Competitive Strategies, and Health Care Regulation, 2004 U.
ILL. L. REV. 137, 138 (2004). In particular, the presence of "uncertainly" in the world of health care
has had important consequences for the shape of the health care marketplace. Among these
consequences is "[a] pattern of skewed, hard to predict costs" that has resulted in a "demand for
health insurance." Id at 139 (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963)). The health care marketplace in the United States
has further differed from the larger marketplace, in that society has been "unwilling to ration
[health] care solely by price." Id. Finally, the health care industry in the U.S. has been characterized
by a "dynamic pattern of growth," with more and more being spent on health care since the start of
the twentieth century. Id. at 140.
108. See Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable?: Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 1121, 1123 (2004) (noting that most health insurance plans do not provide
coverage for infertility care).
Sherrie A. Kossoudji reports that in 2001 there were more than 420 infertility laboratories in
the United States and surrounding territories. See Sherrie A. Kossoudji, The Economics of Assisted
Reproduction
28,
IZA
DP
DISCUSSION
PAPER
No.
1458
(Jan.
2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract-648057.
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Infertility care has become a substantial business in the United
States.10 9 More than most patients, infertility patients resemble the
putatively equal, autonomous actors who populate the commercial
marketplace.110 Infertility care can be very expensive,' 1" and the panoply
of possible "cures" can seem almost unending. Yet, patients often decide
to "buy" the next cure, despite the fact that the emotional and financial
toll (especially in the absence of insurance coverage) can be seriously
burdensome. 1 2 Operation of this expensive health care marketplace
depends in large part on the felt-need of patients, making autonomous
choices that involve them in paying for more and more care, even when
the odds of success are not encouraging. 13
The marketplace in infertility care represents another sort of excess
beyond those identified in rules about informed consent and about
biomedical (including genomic) information. This mode of medical
practice may foreshadow what medical care in general may look like if
the medical profession as a whole tilts more fully toward what Lundberg
refers to as the "business side."' 14
109. See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 614 (2003) (citing Lori Andrews, Reproductive
Technology Comes ofAge, 21 WHITTIER L. REv. 375, 382 (1999)) ("[llnfertility services have been
transformed from a small medical specialty to a four-billion dollar annual industry. Couples seeking
IVF now spend $44,000 to $200,0000 to achieve a single pregnancy."); Gina Kolata, FertilityInc.:
ClinicsRace to Lure Clients, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at FI.
110. In addition to the comparative absence of third-party payers, other factors distinguish this
area of health care from many others and facilitate the establishment of a commercial market in
infertility care. Among these factors are the comparative absence of regulation of treatment for
infertility in the United States, see Noah, supra note 109, at 648 (reporting a comparative absence of
state and federal regulation and failure of tort law and professional self-regulation to control risky
practices among infertility specialists); the deeply felt need, common among infertility patients, to
continue care regardless of expense, see supra note 109 and accompanying text; and the wide set of
increasingly technological treatment options typically offered to infertility patients who have not
been successful with less expensive, less technological levels of care, see Carson Strong, Too Many
Twins, Triplets, Quadruplets, and So On: A Callfor New Priorities,31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 272,
277 (2003) (describing as dangerous the "attitude among infertility physicians" that "the desire of
the couple to have a baby is more important than avoiding risks to the offspring").
11 t. See Pratt, supra note 108, at 1135-36 (noting that the cost of one cycle of in vitro
fertilization can be $10,000; intra-cytoplasmic sperm injection adds about $2,500 to the cost; use of
donor eggs may cost $3,000 to $5,000 but can cost much, much more; and reliance on a surrogate
usually costs between $10,000 and $25,000).
112. See Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Options, 22 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1215, 1223-24 (1997) (citation omitted) (noting that survey respondents
express readiness to spend "29 percent of their after-tax income for a 50 percent chance of having a
child, and willing to risk a 20 percent chance of death in order to have a child").
113. The likelihood of success is small even among the average patient pool. Id.at 1221
(citation omitted) (reporting "that about 15 percent of initiated IVF cycles result in a successful
delivery").
114. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LA WREVIEW

IV.

[Vol. 34:137

THE APPEARANCE OF EXCESS: INFORMATION AND MARKETS

Relationships within the world of health care have been
dramatically reshaped as patients and health care providers have
increasingly been defined through the attributes of autonomous
individuality. This section describes and analyzes a set of excesses that
has accompanied the expansion of the notion of autonomous
individuality within the world of health care. This Article assumes that
these excesses, as that label clearly suggests, are among the less
felicitous consequences of the shift toward the valuation of autonomous
individuality in the world of health care. However, this assessment is not
intended to gainsay the significant benefits for both patients and health
care providers that have resulted from rules requiring respect for patient
autonomy. 1 5
By definition, the changes detailed in this Part are at the margins of
the broader ideological changes that have redefined relationships among
patients and health care providers in the last several decades. However,
even changes at the social and legal margins of the process that have led
to the valuation of individual autonomy in health care settings must be
accounted for when assessing the whole. Among other things, changes
that are marginal when they appear may become the mainstream over
time.
This Part examines three different kinds of excesses that have
followed the social and legal commitment to safeguarding individualism
in health care settings. The first two kinds of excesses, at least in part
concretized through the arm of the law, involve information. The first of
these, referred to here as the elaboration of autonomous individuality
has developed as a result of courts' expanding the reach of the informed
consent doctrine." t6 The second, referred to as the perversion of
autonomous individuality, follows from the informed consent doctrine as
it affects and is effected by rules of confidentiality in reference to
115. In reviewing the moral justification for the informed consent doctrine, Ruth Faden and
Tom Beauchamp write: "[r]espect for autonomy... [in the literature on informed consent] is
conceived as a principle rooted in the liberal Western tradition of the importance of individual
freedom and choice, both for political life and for personal development." FADEN & BEAUCHAMP,
supra note 6, at 7. Faden and Beauchamp continue:
The moral demand that we respect the autonomy of persons can be formulated as a
principle of respect for autonomy: Persons should be free to choose and act without
controlling constraints imposed by others. The principle provides the justificatory basis
for the right to make autonomous decisions, which in turn takes the form of specific
autonomy-related rights.
Id. at 8-9.
116. See infra Part IV.A.
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genetic information. 1 7 And the third example, referred to as the
generalization of autonomous individuality, is illustrated by the
developing market in infertility care. 1 8 This third example, unlike the
other two, has resulted more from the absence than from the presence of
legal constraints. Each excess will be considered in turn.
A.

The ElaborationofIndividualism. Informed Consent

The legal constructions considered in this section portray an
elaboration of the informed consent doctrine that suggests a new mode
of leveling the relationship between doctor and patient. This elaboration
reflects the increasing significance paid by society and the law to patient
from the
autonomy." 9 In addition, though less directly, it has followed
20
transformation of "information" in the era of the Internet. 1

117. See infra Part IV.B.
118. See infra Part IV.C.
119. See supra note 100.
120. The Internet has made once-arcane bits of medical knowledge (as it has made virtually
every other kind of knowledge) widely accessible. This has altered the character of dialogue
between patients and physicians. See Lynn Neary, How the Internet has Changed the Way Doctors
and Their Patients Interactand Communicate, NRP, July 14, 2003 (reviewing the consequences of
patient access to health information through the Internet on the relationship between patient and
physician).
Equally, the Internet has transformed the tone and influenced the direction of legal
deliberations about the informed consent doctrine and about medical information more generally.
See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, An eHealth Diptych: The Impact of Privacy Regulation on Medical
Error and Malpractice Litigation, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 384-94, 394-410 (2001) (examining
consequences of eHealth for malpractice litigation and suggesting privacy regulations intended to
protect electronically stored health information will alter the informed consent doctrine).
No longer does possession of "information" distinguish experts from everyone else. Id.
(reporting on-line survey showing that with regard to certain kinds of practical information the
Internet can be more useful than direct queries to one's doctor).
As information has proliferated, the value of information has changed. Within health care
contexts, information is often more valuable in that patients who seek, uncover, and use information
relevant to health and to health care, can rely on that information to question their health care
providers and to direct their own health care choices. Both patients and health care providers (who
have also benefited by the accessibility of Internet resources) are more informed than they were two
decades ago. See, e.g., Sevan Lawson, Bitter Pill for 'Cyberchondriacs', BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/technology/3736653.stm (last visited Oct. 15, 2005) (referring to Health
on the Net Foundation survey that reported that about half of all people rely on the Internet for
second opinions).
However, as information has proliferated, it has also become less valuable. People
increasingly rely on bits of uncategorized, un-contextualized information gathered from unknown
(and sometimes unknowable) sources that may or may not be reliable. See, e.g., id (suggesting that
information gained online by patients cannot always be trusted and suggesting that information
obtained by patients relying on the net may result in "confusion and unnecessary alarm").
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This Section analyzes two cases involving suits by patients against
their doctors. In both cases, Johnson v. Kokemoor 12 1 and Howard v.
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey,122 a physician was
obliged to have informed, but, in the view of the respective courts, did

not adequately inform, a patient about the physician's own comparative
lack of experience or the physician's lack of certain professional
credentials. Although these cases follow from Canterbury and other

cases resembling Canterbury,'23 they suggest a new message for
physicians and patients, that patients are entitled to be told by their
doctors about the limitations of the doctor as doctor.
In Johnson v. Kokemoor, Wisconsin's highest court considered a

physician's obligation to reveal to a patient information about the
physician's own limited experience with a particular surgical
procedure.124 Dr. Kokemoor, who operated on an aneurysm at the back
of Donna Johnson's brain, failed to disclose, in seeking Johnson's

consent for the surgery, that he was comparatively inexperienced in
clipping the sort of aneurysm from which Johnson suffered. He also
failed to inform Johnson that he was not board certified in
25

neurosurgery. 1
The surgery left Donna Johnson with incomplete quadriplegia.
However, the court did not attribute that result to malpractice on the part
of Dr. Kokemoor. Rather, the court, holding for Johnson, explained that
"[w]hen different physicians have substantially different success rates,
whether surgery is performed by one rather than another represents a
choice between 'alternate, viable medical modes of treatment' under
[Wisconsin statute] § 448.30.,, 126 In particular, expert testimony
introduced by the plaintiff indicated that "the morbidity and mortality
rate expected when a surgeon with the defendant's experience performed
the surgery would be significantly higher than the rate expected when a

121. See Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495,505 (Wis. 1996).
122. See Howard v. Univ. ofMed. & Dentistry, 800 A.2d 73, 83-85 (N.J. 2002).
123. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1,72) (placing on the treating doctor the
duty "of reasonable disclosure of the available choices with respect to proposed therapy and of the
dangers inherently and potentially involved in each").
124. See Johnson, 545 N.W.2d at 505. Other courts have refused to recognize an informed
consent cause-of-action in cases involving physicians who misrepresented or failed to reveal
"personal" information. See, e.g., Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) (suggesting
that plaintiff whose physicians misrepresented "personal" information might have a cause-of-action
for misrepresentation or in negligence but could not rely on the informed consent doctrine with
regard to the misrepresented personal information).
125. See Johnson, 545 N.W.2d at 499.
126. Id. at 507.
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more experienced physician performed the same surgery.' 2 7 The court
reported that articles reviewed by Dr. Kokemoor prior to the surgery,
established that even the most accomplished posterior circulation
aneurysm surgeons reported morbidity and mortality rates of fifteen
percent for basilar bifurcation aneurysms. Furthermore, the plaintiff
introduced expert testimony indicating that the estimated morbidity and
mortality rate one might expect when a physician with the defendant's
relatively limited experience performed the surgery would be close to
thirty percent. 28 The court concluded that these statistics might well
have convinced "a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position" to
forego surgery under Dr. Kokemoor's hand and to seek a more
experienced neurosurgeon. Thus, the Wisconsin court further concluded
that Dr. Kokemoor had failed adequately to inform29 Donna Johnson
about the risks of the surgery to which she consented. 1
The assumption behind Johnson was that had Donna Johnson been
fully informed, she would have selected a different surgeon, not that she
would have foregone the surgery altogether. The court noted plaintiffs
having introduced evidence showing that the "a reasonable physician in
the defendant's position" would have referred Donna Johnson to a more
experienced surgeon. 130 Johnson was able to show that she was left
disabled as a result of the surgery. She was further able to present
statistics showing that the risk of being left disabled was significantly
increased because surgery on her was performed by a comparatively
inexperienced surgeon. She was not, however, able to show that the bad
result would not have occurred if a more experienced surgeon had
performed the operation.' 3' In fact, plaintiffs evidence suggested that
there was more than a ten percent mortality and morbidity rate
associated with the sort of surgery plaintiff underwent, even when that
surgery was performed by a surgeon deemed among the best in the

127. Id. at 506.
128. See id. at 506.
129. Id. at 506-07.
130. Id. at 499-500 (noting, in addition, that the patient should have been sent to a tertiary care
center and that such a center, the Mayo Clinic, was but ninety miles away).
13 1. See id. at 506. Informed consent doctrine requires a plaintiff to show a causal connection
between the undisclosed risk and the harm that resulted. If one presumes that Donna Johnson, if
informed about Dr. Kokemoor's comparative inexperience, would not have foregone the surgery but
would have selected a more experienced surgeon, then she is required to show that the harm that
befell her was the result of her not having been privy to the information (in this case about Dr.
Kokemoor's inexperience) that would have led her to select a different surgeon. See also Howard v.
Univ. Med. & Dentistry 800 A.2d 73, 79-80 (N. J. 2002) (summarizing analysis of damages in such
cases).
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world.132 Thus, the court in Johnson, relied on estimates of comparative
risk. 133 Although it was virtually assumed that the bad result could be
attributed to Dr. Kokemoor's inexperience, there was a significant risk,
as reported by the Johnson court, of a bad result even had Kokemoor
been rejected in favor of a more experienced doctor. 134 In short, it is
difficult to ascertain whether the risk in question occurred or not.
Six years later, in Howard v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of
New Jersey,135 the New Jersey Supreme Court entertained a case that
raised similar questions. The New Jersey court reached a decision that
modified the broad obligation on the physician suggested by Johnson,
but that, nonetheless, held a physician responsible for having failed
accurately to inform a patient
(who consented to surgery) about the
36
physician's qualifications. 1
In 1997, Dr. Robert Heary performed neck surgery on Joseph
Howard, who had been injured as a result of two separate automobile
accidents, one in 1991 and a second in 1997. The surgery left Howard
with quadriplegia. Howard,
who had consented to the surgery, sued Dr.
37
negligence.'
for
Heary
Howard and his wife (who had attended pre-surgery consultations
between her husband and the physician) claimed that they discovered
only as a result of Dr. Howard's deposition testimony that he had not
accurately informed them about his experience and professional
credentials-that, among other things, he was not, in fact, board certified
in neurosurgery. 138 Howard then moved to amend his complaint by
132. See Johnson, 545 N.W.2d at 499.
133. The court found that Dr. Kokemoor was obliged to inform Donna Johnson about his
comparative inexperience with the surgery he recommended, that he was obliged to report
"comparative risk evidence," and that Johnson should have been informed about a tertiary care
center where her surgery could have been done by a surgeon more experienced than defendant. Id.
at 507-09.
134. See id.at 499. The court premised its decision on the importance of the patient's not
having received information about the defendant's comparative success rate as compared with a
more experienced surgeon. However, it should also be noted that, if plaintiff's testimony was
correct, Dr. Kokemoor had in effect lied to her when he told her that he had previously performed
the recommended surgery "dozens" of times. Id. In fact, he had performed many (about thirty)
operations involving aneurysms during his residency and about six times after his residency, but
these operations involved a different (and more easily treatable) sort of aneurysm than that from
which the plaintiff suffered. Id. at 499-500. It is not possible to know to what extent, if any, this
evidence that the defendant had lied influenced the court's view of the case.
135. 800 A.2d 73 (N.J. 2002).
136. See id.at 83.
137. See id.at 76.
138. See id.at 76-77 (noting that Dr. Heary had given deposition testimony to the effect that he
was not board certified when he operated on Joseph Howard and that he had done "a couple dozen"
operations of the sort he did on Howard "during his career").
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adding a fraud claim. The state supreme court, overturning the decision
of the court below, refused to allow Howard to base his amended case on
a cause-of-action in fraud.1 39 However, the court found Howard had a
cognizable claim that Heary had failed adequately to provide
information on which Howard premised his consent to surgery. 140 The
court, declining to obligate physicians to document details about their
"background and experience as part of the required informed consent
disclosure,"' 14 1 concluded that "significant misrepresentations concerning
qualifications can affect the validity of consent
a physician's
142
obtained."'
Finally, the New Jersey court in Howard noted that the plaintiff
would be faced with a heavy burden in proving both that his risk of harm
was "substantially increased" as a consequence of defendant's limited
experience and credentials and that a "reasonably prudent person" would
not have consented to Dr. Heary's performing the surgery in question
had that "reasonably prudent" person known about the doctor's
comparative inexperience and lack of credentials. 143 If Howard was able
to meet that burden, then, the court concluded, he "may be compensated
for that injury caused by [the neck surgery] irrespective of whether
from the standard of care in performing the surgical
defendant deviated
144
procedure.'

Thus the decision in Howard resembles that in Johnson in allowing
an injured patient/plaintiff to succeed even though the
physician/defendant did not commit malpractice and even though the
patient was aware of the broad risks of the procedure to which he or she
consented. 45 In both cases, the plaintiffs cause-of-action related to
provider-specific information.
In this regard, Johnson and Howard represent an elaboration of the
46 They also represent a
doctrine laid down in cases such as Canterbury.1
139. Id. at 82.
140. Id. at 86.
141. Id.at 82.
142. Id.at 83.

143. Id. at 84-85.
144. Id.at 85.
145. Other courts have declined to follow the model laid down in Johnson v. Kokemoor. For
instance, the Court of Appeals of Washington concluded that a surgeon was not obliged, as part of
the informed consent process, to tell his patient that he had only recently learned how to perform the
procedure (a laparoscopic cholecystectomy) that he proposed performing on her or that he had never
performed one on a human (though he had practiced the procedure during a two-day course).
Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
146. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see supra notes 85-89, 96 and
accompanying text (discussing Canterbury).
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shift in focus. In Canterbury, the center of the court's concern was the
patient and his right to information about the risks of a proposed
treatment (surgery on the plaintiffs back). 147 In contrast, in both
Johnson and Howard, unrevealed or inaccurate information about the
limitations of the doctors' experience and qualifications constituted the
essential issue.
To say this somewhat differently, Canterbury reflects a court
focused on empowering the patient while Johnson and Howard reflect
an effort to disempower the physicians. Canterbury, on the one hand,
and Johnson and Howard on the other, reflect different aspects of a
broader process that has redefined the physician-patient relationship
during the last several decades. Canterbury presumes the centrality of
the patient's autonomy and thus works to equalize the relationship
between physician and patient. Johnson and Howard, in contrast, stress
the physician's limitations. Together, the two perspectives, both justified
with reference to the notion that consent to health care should be
predicated on the communication to patients of information about that
care, represent a broad re-shaping of the traditional physician-patient
1 48
relationship that once prized hierarchy and assumed paternalism.
However, the stress in Johnson and Howard works to minimize (and
perhaps even to undermine) physician autonomy far more than the stress
in Canterbury.
B. The Perversionof Individualism: Genetic Information
A different set of concerns about patient autonomy and medical
information has arisen with regard to genetic information.149 In this
context, the possibility of distorting the meaning of autonomous
individuality is striking. This Section reviews that possibility and
suggests its implications.

147.
148.
149.

Id.
See supra notes 121-144 and accompanying text.
See Mark A. Rothstein, Policy Makers Need to Address Genetic Issues, EMP. TESTING: L.

& POL'Y REP., Mar. 1998, at 41 (distinguishing genetic information from other sorts of information
in that genes reveal information about families and larger social groups as well as information about
future health risks; genetic information is "transgenerational" and thus implicates "self-identity" and
"individuality;" moreover, "stigma" is often attached to genetic information). Rothstein notes that
genetic information is distinguishable from other sorts of medical information largely because "it is
regarded as unique." Id.
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There is widespread concern about discriminatory uses of genetic
information. 150 Life and health insurers have denied coverage on the
basis of genetic test results; 15' employers have conditioned offers of
employment and continued employment on genetic testing. 5 2 Schools,' 53
blood banks, 154 prisons,' 55 and adoption agencies 156 have similarly
limited services as a result of genetic test results. Moreover, the uses and
abuses of genetic information have multiplied as a result of Internet
access which dramatically expands the potential for the proliferation of
genetic information. 57 State legislatures 58 and Congress have begun to
respond. 159

150. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What is Wrong with
Genetic Discrimination, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1439, 1443 (2001) (noting concern that genetic
information can be used for disadvantageous purposes).
151. See, e.g., Robyn B. Nicoll, Comment, Long-Term Care Insurance and Genetic
Discrimination-Get it While You're Young and Ignorant: An Examination of Current
Discriminatory Problems in Long-Term Care Insurance Through the Use of Genetic Information,
13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 751, 762-63 (2003) (detailing how insurers gain access to genetic
information).
152. See David J. Wukitsch, New York's Legal Restrictions on Employer's Collection and Use
of Employee's Genetic Information, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 39, 40-41 (1998) (reporting
employers' uses of employees' genetic information).
153. Kourtney L. Pickens, Don't Judge Me by My Genes: A Survey of Federal Genetic
Discrimination Legislation, 34 TULSA L.J. 161, 162 n.5 (1998).
154. The Potential for Discrimination in Health Insurance Based on Predictive Genetic Tests:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Commerce, Trade and Consumer Prot. of the Comm. on
Energy
and
Commerce,
107th
Cong.
11
(2001),
available
at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
155. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 VAND.
L. REv 313, 328-29 (1992).
156. See Diver & Cohen, supra note 150, at 1443.
157. See Frances H. Miller, Forward: Phase II of the Genetics Revolution: Sophisticated Issues
for Home and Abroad, 28 AM. J. L. AND MED. 145, 149 (2002) (recognizing the importance of
regulations safeguarding privacy from revelation of genetic information on the Internet under the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936, 2023 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 28 and 42 U.S.C.)).
158. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-54-1 (2004) (discussing genetic testing).
159. In October 2003, the Senate passed a bill prohibiting insurers from denying medical
coverage or setting premiums on the basis of genetic information. The bill also prohibits employers
from using genetic information in making decisions about hiring and firing employees. Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, S. 1053, 108th Cong., (as passed by U.S. Senate, Oct.
14, 2003). A similar bill was passed in the Senate (98 to 0) in 2005, but was held up in the House.
See Ronald Kotulak, Genes: Your Body's Crystal Ball, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 2005, at C l (attributing
the response in the House to "strong objections from the health insurance industry and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce").
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Many genetic tests are now available. 160 Whether genetic tests are
performed on embryos in vitro, 161 on fetuses in uteri, 162 on children 163 or
on adults, the information the tests provide is viewed differently than
other medical information. Most information discerned from medical
testing relates to the person tested. If testing reveals that a person has a
broken leg, an appendicitis, or an ulcer, that information will generally
have little direct relevance to discerning the physical condition (present
or future) of anyone but the affected person. If a person tests positive for
a genetic alteration associated with an illness or disability, however, that
information is immediately perceived164 as relevant to the health status
of the patient's family members and possibly to 65
members of his or her
ethnic, racial, national or religious group as well. 1
Genetic information has a usual combination of attributes. It is the
most individualistic of all information. An individual's genome is
unique. Yet, genomic characteristics are shared among family members
and among members of larger groups defined through reference to
ancestral groups, including groups that society views as ethnic or
66
racial. 1
Genomic medicine harmonizes remarkably well with a society
concerned for over two centuries with safeguarding autonomous
160. See David Wessel, Capital: Wanted: Public Policies to Help Genetic Testing Fulfill Its
Promise, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2003, at A2. (reporting availability of about 900 genetic tests). The
predictive value of genetic tests is variable. Genetic testing in an a-symptomatic patient may
indicate the possibility or likelihood that the patient will become ill or disabled. Some conditions
associated with genetic alterations can be either prevented or treated; others, such as Huntington's
Disease, cannot be prevented or treated. Testing for certain genetic alterations (for example, that
associated with Huntington's Disease) has very high predictive value. Testing for other conditions
does not. For instance, up to fifteen percent of women who test positive for BRCA 1, associated with
breast cancer, and who, furthermore, have close family members with breast cancer, will not
develop the condition. LORI B. ANDREWS ET AL., GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 225-26
(2002).
161. See Jeffrey R. Botkin, PrenatalDiagnosisand the Selection of Children,30 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 265, 280-83 (2002).
162. See id at 159-60.
163. Lainie Friedman Ross & Margaret R. Moon, Ethical Issues in Pediatric Genetics, in
GENETICS IN THE CLINIC: CLINICAL, ETHICAL, AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIMARY CARE 153
(Mary Briody Mahowald et al. eds., 2001).
164. The claim being made here is not that genetic information is genuinely different from
other sorts of medical information. Rather, it is that it is seen as being different in the manner
specified in the accompanying text.
165. See Mark Levin, Screening Jews and Gentiles: A Considerationof the Ethics of Genetic
Screening Within the Jewish Community: Challenges and Responses, 3 GENETIC TESTING 207
(1999) (noting potential of genetic testing for group stigmatization). See generally Anita LaFrance
Allen, Genetic Testing. Nature, and Trust, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 887 (1997) (discussing the
vulnerability of American Blacks to discriminatory use of genetic information).
166. See Rothstein, supra note 149, at 41.
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individuality. Even more, the social dangers that inhere in the use and
dissemination of genomic information resemble a set of social dangers
that have long inhered in Western society. This Section is devoted to
detailing, and exploring the implications of, these claims.
Deeply committed to the preservation of equality and liberty, postEnlightenment ideology has also provided for the development of
racism. Racism suggests a profound opacity at the center of Western
culture. Yet it is predicated on an ideological shift that developed early
in the history of egalitarianism. To quote the French anthropologist
Louis Dumont, "once equality and identity bear on the individual souls,
distinction could only be effected with regard to the bodies."167 "What is
more," continues Dumont, "discrimination is collective, it is as if only
physical characteristics were essentially collective where everything
mental tends to be primarily individual. 168
Gunnar Myrdal noted a similar link between egalitarianism and
racism in the U.S.:
The dogma of racial inequality may, in a sense, be regarded as a
strange fruit of the Enlightenment .... The race dogma is nearly the
only way out for a people so moralistically equalitarian, if it is not
prepared to live up to its faith .... [R]acegprejudice is, in this sense, a
function [a perversion] of egalitarianism.
In short, racism can be understood as a perversion of individualism
and egalitarianism. Moreover, it is a perversion that develops not
outside, but firmly inside a society that prizes individualism and
egalitarianism. Racism, in Dumont's view, is not foreign to a society
committed to Enlightenment values. Rather, racism in the United States
emerged as an exception (a reflection of hierarchy) that co-exists with
the society's self-conscious endorsement of equality.
Dumont and Myrdal are suggesting in this regard that racism grew
out of and is a perversion of individualism and egalitariansim. This
167. See LOUIS DUMONT, APPENDIX, HOMO HIERARCHICUS 255 (Mark Sainsbury trans.,
1970).
168.
169.

Id.
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN

DEMOCRACY 89 (20th Anniversary ed. 1962) (citing and quoting DUMONT, supra note 167, at 256).
Although the issue is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that Myrdal and
Dumont differ in their understanding of caste. For Dumont, caste is the essence of a social system
(such as that in traditional India) that prizes holism and hierarchy. In such a system, each caste is
viewed as an integral part of a structured whole. See generally DUMONT, supra note 167, at 19.
Myrdal, on the other hand, (who was not a student of traditional India in particular) sees the caste
system as akin to racism because both oppress people identified with specific groups. See id. at 23958 (analyzing Myrdal's understanding of caste).
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Section suggests that certain applications of rules about the disclosure of
genetic information reflect a similar grounding in and perversion of
individualism and egalitarianism.
A 1996 New Jersey case, Safer v. Estate of Pack,170 is illustrative.7
The case is presented here as a cultural document, not a rule of law.' '
The legal case was commenced by Donna Safer against Dr. George
Pack. 172 In 1990, Donna Safer, then thirty-six years old and newly
married, was diagnosed with a hereditary form of colon cancer. At the
173
time of Donna's diagnosis, the disease had already metastasized.
Twenty-six years earlier, when Donna was ten,74 her father, Robert
Batkin, had died of the same form of colon cancer.'
In 1992, Donna commenced suit against Dr. George Pack, 1 75 who
had cared for her father during the seven years of Batkin's illness. 76 Dr.
Pack had never treated Donna. Yet, Donna's suit implied that Dr. Pack
had provided her with negligent medical care. 177 Donna Safer, and her
husband, himself a physician, claimed that Dr. Pack violated 7his
8
professional duty in failing to warn Donna that her health was at risk. 1
The trial court dismissed the Safers' petition, concluding that 179a
doctor was under no duty to warn a patient's child of a genetic risk.
The trial court further distinguished Donna Safer's case from others in
which courts had imposed a duty on physicians to warn relatives of
patients suffering from infectious diseases of the risk that they also had
been exposed to the condition from which their relative suffered. 180 The
trial court explained that with genetic conditions "the harm is already
170. 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
171.

In 1996, the same year that the case was decided, the state legislature passed a law that

places limits on physicians' communication of genetic information to third parties. Genetic Privacy
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1713:30-12 (West 1996). See infra note 251 and accompanying text.

172. More detailed discussions of this case and its implications can be found in Janet L.
Dolgin, Personhood, Discrimination, and the New Genetics, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 755, 802-16
(2001); Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation of the
Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, 552-58, 562-65 (2000).
173. See Safer,677 A.2d at1190.
174. See id.

175. Dr. George Pack died in 1969. Donna Safer and her husband brought suit against the
estate of Dr. Pack. See id.
176. See id.
at 1189-90.
177.

Seeid.at 1190.

178. Presumably the warning should have come through Donna's mother or in some sort of
unorthodox memorandum sent to Donna's own doctor because Donna was only ten years old when
her father died. Id.
179. See id
180. See id. at 1191; L.J. Deftos, Genomic Torts: The Law of the Future-the Duty of
Physicians toDisclose the Presence of a Genetic Disease to the Relatives of Their Patients with the
Disease, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 105, 132-34 (1997) (analyzing "duty to disclose" cases).
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present within the non-patient child8 .... The patient is taking no action
in which to cause the child harm."' 1
On appeal, the New Jersey appellate court disagreed with the trial
82
court and ordered that the case be sent back to the lower court for trial.
Due to the posture of the case when it reached the appellate court, that
court assumed that plaintiffs were correct in claiming that the hereditary
nature of the disease was known at the time Dr. Pack was treating Mr.
Batkin and that the physician was required, by medical standards then
prevailing, to warn those at risk so that they might have the benefits of
early examination, monitoring, detection and treatment, that would
provide opportunity
to avoid the most baneful consequences of the
83
condition.
In addition, the appellate court defined a duty to warn about genetic
predispositions because "[t]he individual or group at risk is easily
identified."' 8 4 Judge Kestin, writing for the court, explained: "[T]he duty
[is appropriately] seen as owed not only to the patient himself but ... it
also 'extend[s] beyond the interests of a patient to members of the
immediate family of 85
the patient who may be adversely affected by a
duty."'
that
of
breach
Safer was not unprecedented in eliminating the traditional
requirement that a professional is responsible only to one with whom he
or she is in a relationship of privity.1 86 Other courts had imposed liability
on doctors for failing to warn non-patients at risk of contracting a

181. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1191. The trial court's explanation reflects widespread confusion about
the categorization of predispositions to illness based on genetic alterations in the absence of
symptomatology. See Katskee v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 515 N.W.2d 645, 651-52 (Neb. 1994)
(deciding plaintiff's familial history of breast and ovarian cancer categorized her as ill, even though
she had no symptoms or signs of cancer, and thus entitled her to insurance coverage for removal of
her uterus, ovaries, and fallopian tubes).
182. See Safer, 677 A.2d at 1189.
183. Seeid.atll91.
184. See id. at 1192.
185. Id. (quoting Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 839 (N.J. 1981)).
186. Among other things, Safer and cases that resemble it pose a duty to warn third parties
against a physician's obligation to protect patient confidences. That obligation has long been viewed
as fundamental. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 317

(5th ed. 2004). However, the legal source of the confidentiality is less clear. Most states have a
testimonial privilege, protecting patient confidences from disclosure in court. Id. at 323. Certain
sorts of medical information are protected specifically, see, Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and
Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 290dd-3 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986) (cited in FURROW, supra, at
324), and state licensing laws often imply that physicians must protect patient confidences. See
FURROW, supra, at 323-25 (reviewing other possible sources of physician obligation to protect
patient confidences).
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contagious disease from the physician's patient;' 87 for failing to warn
individuals known to be at risk of harm from a mentally ill patient;188
and for failing to warn a patient's relative about a foreseeable, noncontagious condition (from which the physician's patient suffered and
for which the relative was at risk). 189
In a 1995 Florida case, resembling Safer, Florida's highest court
imposed a duty to third parties on physicians whose patients suffered
from genetic conditions.190 In 1990, Heidi Pate, who had recently been
diagnosed with medullary thyroid carcinoma, brought suit against the
health care providers who had treated her mother for the same condition
three years earlier. The defendants responded that a physician's duty
should not be extended to "third party non-patients."' 9' Florida's highest
court disagreed, concluding that:
[W]hen the prevailing standard of care creates a duty that is obviously
for the benefit of certain identified third parties and the physician
knows of the existence of those third parties, then the physician's duty
runs to those third parties. Therefore... we hold that privity does not
bar Heidi Pate's pursuit of a medical malpractice action ....[U]nder
the duty alleged in92 this case, a patient's children fall within the zone of
foreseeable risk.1
The court recognized Heidi Pate's standing to bring the suit.' 93 It
did not, however, permit Pate to premise the case on the doctor's failure
to warn her.194 Rather, the Pate court recognized Heidi Pate's right to
argue that her mother's doctor was responsible for warning his patient
that her children and certain other relatives were at risk of developing
the disease from which she suffered. The court explained:
To require the physician to seek out and warn various members of the
patient's family would often be difficult or impractical and would

187. See, e.g., Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Liability of Doctor or OtherHealth Practitioner
to Third Party Contracting Contagious Disease from Doctor's Patient, 3 A.L.R. 5th 370 (1992).
188. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 353 (Cal. 1976) (concluding
that a therapist is obliged to warn a third party about a known risk of harm from therapist's patient).
189. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1993) (obliging physician to have
warned wife of patient who suffered from Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever that she was also at risk
of coming down with the condition because she and her husband had walked in an area that exposed
them to the tick that causes Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever).
190. Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1995).
191. Answer Brief of Appellees Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc. and Florida Board
of Regents at 7-8, Pate, 661 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1995) (No. 84289).
192. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 282.
193. ld. at 281-82.
194. Seeid at 282.
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place too heavy a burden upon the physician. Thus, we emphasize that
in any circumstances in which the physician has a duty to wam of a
genetically 1transferable
disease, that duty will be satisfied by warning
95
the patient.
In contrast, the New Jersey court that decided Safer concluded that
Dr. Pack, who treated Donna Safer's father, was under a duty to warn
not only his patient, but his patient's children and presumably certain
other close relatives as well, about the risk that they, too, carried the
genetic alteration associated with colon cancer. The implications of the
holding are staggering.
The decision suggests a stunning reinterpretation of autonomous
individuality that displaces focus on the individual person with focus on
a genetic whole that includes any number of separate, essentially
undifferentiable people. The whole is itself understood according to the
metaphor of the individual. That is, from the perspective of the genetic
whole, the basic unit of social value contains an unspecified number of
units, all identical insofar as they are viewed with reference to shared
genes. Individuals who form the larger whole are not important as
such' 96 but only because they replicate the genetic pattern (whatever it
is) presumed to define the whole.
The social consequences of this view are enormous.' 97 Among them
is a far-reaching shift in the meaning of privacy. Safer, for instance,
eviscerates the notion of individual privacy as it has existed in the West
for several hundred years. Safer defines the unit to which privacy is
owed, not as the individual person, but as some larger genetic whole
98
within which any individual is rendered substitutable for any other.'
This result is inherent in the notion of autonomous individuality,
but as a perversion of that notion. Conceptually, the genetic family, or
presumably the genetic ethnic group or racial group, replicates its units,
each of which replicates each of the others.' 99 That understanding of a
genetic group presumes that each unit (each person) within the larger
195.

Id.

196.

See KAJA FINKLER, EXPERIENCING THE NEW GENETICS: FAMILY AND KINSHIP ON THE

MEDICAL FRONTIER (2000) (describing ideology of genetic inheritance). The postulates of an
ideology of genetic inheritance make sense from within a perspective that focuses on groups
presumed to share genetic traits.
197. An analysis of these consequences from a somewhat different perspective can be found in
Dolgin, Personhood,Discrimination,and the New Genetics, supra note 172, at 802-12.
198.

See Robert Wachbroit, Rethinking Medical Confidentiality: The Impact of Genetics, 27

SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1391, 1401-02 (1993) (noting that "a health professional's duty might be to
respect the privacy" of some whole viewed in genetic terms, such as the family).
199. See id. at 1402.
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whole enjoys no privacy vis-a-vis the other units. Each is presumptively
fungible for each of the others, and thus the privacy of each is the
privacy of all. In that vein, the patient in Safer, Robert Batkin, and his
daughter, Donna Safer, were envisioned by the court as two parts of one
whole. The court defined the doctor's obligation to extend to the whole,
not only to the parts (i.e., the particular people composing the genetic
whole). That is, Robert Batkin's doctor owed a duty to his patient as
well as to his patient's child because from the perspective of the genetic
family the two were not differentiable.20 0
Safer leaves a wide variety of questions unanswered: How far does
the obligation extend? Does it include a patient's siblings, parents,
cousins, third cousins? What is the physician's obligation to locate such
people? Does the obligation to reveal genetic information overcome the
patient's desire to keep the information confidential? The court
expressly noted this last conundrum but left it for the trial court, when
reconsidering the case20 1 to decide whether, "there are or ought to be any
limits on physician-patient confidentiality, especially after the patient's
death where a risk of harm survives the patient, as in the case of genetic
consequences.202 But at present, Safer and the questions it raises are
more important as illustration and warning than as law. After the New
Jersey appellate court rendered its decision, the state legislature
significantly limited a doctor's duty20 3to reveal information about a
patient's genetic condition to relatives.
200. Clearly, the court understood that even from the perspective of genomic information
Robert Batkin and Donna Safer were differentiable. However, by focusing on one relevant genetic
alteration, presumptively shared by Batkin and his daughter, the court appropriated a view of the

genetic family that rendered its individual members indistinguishable.
201. In 1999 the case was tried. The jury held for the defendant, Dr. Pack, apparently on the
ground that there was evidence that Donna Safer had, in fact, known about the risk to herself of
becoming ill with the disease from which her father died. See E-mail from Connie Lenz, Assistant
Director, Maurice A. Deane Law Library, Hofstra University School of Law, to author (Oct. 6,
1999, 16:38 CST) (summarizing discussion with Gary Maher, attorney for the plaintiff) (on file with
author). The author is grateful to Gary Maher for supplying briefs in the case.
202.

Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1193 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).

203. Genetic Privacy Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-45 (West 2004). The statute, passed in 1996,
limits a health care provider's obligation to disclose genetic information to third parties to cases in
which the patient has consented to the revelation or the patient has died.

Federal law now imposes strict rules on a physician's right to disclose information about
patients. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191
(codified in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (West 2005)
[hereinafter HIPAA]. However, HIPAA does not safeguard genetic information in any special
manner. Thus, it does not provide complete privacy for genetic information, as it does not provide
complete protection for any medical information. For instance, HIPAA does not protect genetic test
results obtained during research, and it does not protect DNA samples. Allison Ito, Privacy and
Genetics: Protecting Genetic Test Results in Hawaii, 25 HAWAII L. REv. 449, 461-62 (2003).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss1/7

36

Dolgin: The Evolution of the "Patient": Shifts in Attitudes About Consent
SHIFTING ATTITUDES IN HEALTH CARE

2005]

Thus, Safer serves primarily as a cultural document that reflects a
troubling understanding of the relationship between the individual
person and a larger, genetically defined group of people. Safer's
message is reflected as well in a 1998 Statement of the American
Society of Human Genetics (ASHG).20 4 The ASHG Statement proposed
giving health care providers discretion to contravene usual rules of
privacy in certain situations involving genetic information. Those
situations include cases,
where attempts to encourage disclosure on the part of the patient have
failed; where the harm is highly likely to occur and is serious and
foreseeable; where the at-risk relative(s) is identifiable; and where
either the disease is preventable/treatable or medically accepted
20 5
standards indicate that early monitoring will reduce the genetic risk.
The ASHG Statement differs from Safer in that the Statement
proposes discretionary revelation of genetic information whereas the
Safer court concluded that in certain cases revelation of genetic
information should be mandatory. Both, however, depend on a similar
understanding of family. The genetic family presumed by Safer and by
the ASHG is defined through reference to shared DNA. Individuals and
the larger genetic whole from which they cannot be distinguished are
defined exclusively in terms of the genome they are presumed to
share. 20 6 This understanding of family is rarely explicit. Yet, it
of family that stress the unity
harmonizes with traditional understandings
20 7
"blood.
shared
through
effected
As a practical matter, the notion of the genetic group raises difficult
questions within the world of health care. Most important, the notion of
Moreover, the regulations provide an exception that may cover the sort of situation at issue in Safer.
"Covered entities" under HIPAA (including "(1) A health plan. (2) A health care clearinghouse. (3)
A health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form .. "45 C.F.R.
164.104 (2004)), may disclose "protected health information" to someone who is either at risk of
becoming ill or of spreading an illness as long as some other law provides for transmission of the
relevant information. 45 C.F.R. 164.512 (2004).
204. See generally The American Society of Human Genetics Social Issues Subcommittee on
Familial Disclosure, ASHG Statement: ProfessionalDisclosureof Familial Genetic Information, 62
AM. J. HUM. GENET. 474 (1998) [hereinafter ASHG Statement].
205. Id. at 474. The ASHG Statement proposed further limiting revelation of otherwise
confidential information to cases in which "[t]he harm that may result from failure to disclose
should outweigh the harm that may result from disclosure." Id.
206. These issues are described in greater detail in Dolgin, Personhood, Discrimination,and
the New Genetics, supra note 172, at 808-12.
207.

See

David M.

Schneider,

AMERICAN

KINSHIP: A CULTURAL

ACCOUNT

(1968)

(deciphering the cultural assumptions underlying American families before family life was widely
redefined, beginning in the early 1970s).
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"patient" is transformed. Indeed the ASHG Statement characterizes
genetic information as a "family possession rather than simply a
personal one., 20 8 That perspective conflicts sharply with the usual
understanding of medical information 2in
contemporary society (at least
09
in relation to competent adult patients).

In short, Safer and the ASHG Statement similarly suggest a novel
and rather discomforting view of genetic groups. For each, the individual
person is eviscerated by the greater significance of the genetic whole.
Genetic groups (such as the genetic family) represent a peculiar
involution of individualism. They displace the interests of the individual
in favor of the interests of the whole, while defining the whole through
the metaphor of the individual. The French social theorist Louis Dumont
described this possibility as the consequence of an "attempt, in a society
where individualism is deeply rooted and predominant, to subordinate it
to the primacy of the society as a whole. '1 0

208.

ASHG Statement, supra note 203, at 476 (quoting Dorothy Wertz et al., GUIDELINES ON

ETHICAL ISSUES IN MEDICAL-GENETICS AND THE PROVISION OF GENETIC SERVICES (1995)).

209. Older understandings of medical information and of who has the right to learn about such
information differ from both the contemporary understanding and from that suggested by Safer. As
the so-called "traditional" family was displaced by the modem "family-of-choice," an older
understanding of medical information as belonging to the family, or more accurately to the pater
familias (the head of family), was displaced by an understanding of medical information as the
possession only of the individual being tested or treated.
Within the world of traditional families, the family as a unit was viewed by the law as
autonomous. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (1963) (refusing to intervene to
protect interests of a wife who alleged that her husband failed adequately to provide for her).
However, the understanding of genetic information as a family possession (as presented in the
ASHG Statement) differs fundamentally from nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century
understandings of medical information as a "family" matter. This difference reflects the
fundamental difference between the so-called "genetic family" and the traditional family. In the
context of the traditional family, understood broadly as a small universe of fixed, hierarchically
structured roles, husbands were given medical information about their wives, and parents about their
children. See Tooley v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617, 618 (La. Ct. App.
1963) (finding a doctor not bound by the duty to safeguard a woman's medical records from her
husband). See Deftos, supra note 180, at 113 (discussing Tooley). For the most part, however, those
lower in the status-based pattern of hierarchically structured family roles (wives and children) were
not privy to medical information about husbands and parents.
Thus, the assumptions behind the ASHG Statement suggest a family unit quite different
than that identified with the traditional family. The Statement relies on the work of Robert
Wachbroit to explain the implications of the claim that genetic information is a "family possession."
The Statement explains that Wachbroit presents "a family-health model that contemplates the
physician's patient as the entire family; 'family' is understood to refer to a genetic network rather
than a social institution. Therefore, the physician's duties pertain to the genetic family as a whole."
ASHG Statement, supra note 204, at 476 n.2 (citing Robert Wachbroit, Genetics Rethinking
Medical Confidentiality: The Impact of Genetics, 27 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1391 (1993)).
210.

DUMONT, supra note 167, at 250.
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As a theoretical matter, that possibility, central to social fascism, is
antithetical to an order that values autonomous individuality; yet, at the
same time, it is a transformation of that order, and can develop from it.
C.

The Generalizationof Individualism: The Patientas Consumer in
the Marketplace of Infertility Care

This Section suggests a third consequence of the importation of the
notion of autonomous individuality into the world of health care, the
appearance of the patient as consumer in a marketplace of health care
options.
For most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, health care
remained separate, at least conceptually, from the marketplace of
consumer goods.21 1 Moreover, until the last decades of the twentieth
century, medical practice was shaped through a set of professional rules
and obligations that differed from the rules generally assumed in the
marketplace. 212 The advent of managed care, sophisticated technology,
high costs, and the "informed" patient in the second half of the twentieth
century, displaced old models of the patient-physician relationship and
provided for the emergence of the patient as consumer.2 13 Moreover, the
"informed patient" merges with the notion of the "informed
notion of the
2 14
consumer."
Patients have begun to see themselves as consumers. This
transformation is particularly evident in the context of infertility care.
This domain of health care has become an expensive marketplace of
consumer choices: IVF clinics advertize widely in print media 215 and on
the Internet; health insurance is less likely to pay for infertility treatment
than for most other forms of health care; 216 patients using third-party
211. Even when medicine was largely a cottage industry, health care was rendered in exchange
for money. However, the relationship between patient and health care providers did not resemble
the relationship between merchant and consumer so much as that between ministers and
congregants.
212.

See STARR, supra note 4, at 25 (describing physicians as "one of the few occupational

groups in the twentieth century able to resist the current that has drawn self-employed artisans and
craftsmen of all kinds into the orbit of industrial and bureaucratic organization").
213. See supra notes 5-6, 212 and accompanying text.
214. RoY PORTER, THE GREATEST BENEFIT TO MANKIND 660 (1999) (noting development of

various consumer groups that "challenged the [medical] profession's monopoly").
215.

See

ELIZABETH

BARTHOLET,

FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION

AND THE

POLITICS OF

PARENTING 187-88 (1993) (noting the presence of advertisements for 1VF clinics more than a
decade ago).
216. Only about one-fifth of large companies in the United States provide health insurance that
covers infertility treatments. Julie Appleby, Pricey Infertility Care Sparks Insurance Clash, USA
TODAY,

Dec.

18,

2001,

available at

http://www.usatoday.com/money/covers/2001-12-19-
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gametes "shop" for donors; 217 and when one treatment does not produce
the desired end-as when a new hair product or a new make of
automobile fails to satisfy the consumer-there will almost invariably be
even "newer" and "better" options available soon.2 18 Some infertility
clinics even forgive payment if a pregnancy does not result or offer
patients the opportunity to receive treatment at lower prices if they agree
to participate in clinical trials.219 Moreover, the variety of treatment
options constantly being developed and offered to infertility patients
resembles the variety of new and better products offered to consumers
by stores and manufacturers.
In short, since 1978 with the birth of the first child conceived in
vitro, a profitable and largely unregulated market in treatments for
infertility has developed in the U.S. 220 One commentator, echoing many

others, has described reproductive technology as "a multibillion dollar
industry

based

solely

on

consumer

demand." 221 Even

more,

developments in genetics, combined with developments in reproductive
bcovwed.htm. About a quarter of the states mandate some form of infertility coverage. Randy
Diamond, Insurance Coverage Mandatedfor Infertility, THE RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Sept.
1, 2001, at A 17. A few other states (e.g., California, New York, Connecticut, Texas) require health
insurance companies to offer infertility coverage but do not require employers to buy it. See
Appleby, supra.
217. See Irene Sege, A $50,000 Dilemma on Campus, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1999, at Al
(describing an advertisement placed in student newspapers seeking tall, smart ova donors and
offering to pay up to $50,000 for the ova).
218. Over a decade ago, Elizabeth Bartholet described the difficulty for infertility patients of
giving up on care, even after long periods of unsuccessful care. After spending a decade trying to
become pregnant and eight years being treated by doctors for infertility, Bartholet "constrained
by... limited funds and the fact that there was then no insurance coverage for IVF" decided to stop
seeking treatment. BARTHOLET, supra note 215, at 198. But, she adds, "[i]f I could have gone on, I
might well have 'chosen' to do so." Id.
219. See generally Antonio Regalado, Clinical Trials Offer In-Vitro at a Discount, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 13, 2004, at Dl.
220. The issue of regulation often arises in connection with an allegation of abuse within the
world of fertility treatment. One recent allegation involved Richard Gladu's claim that Boston IVF
did not have his permission to impregnate his estranged wife with an embryo produced from her egg
and Gladu's sperm. Gladu brought a $3 million lawsuit in which he claimed financial ruin as a
result of a child support obligation and emotional troubles due to his conflicting responses to the
child produced as a result of the insemination. See Doreen..ludica Vigue, Boston Clinic Sued Over
Use of Embryo, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 20, 1998, at Al.
In February 2004, a Massachusetts trial court ordered Boston IVF to pay $98,000 to Gladu
for the cost of bringing up his then-seven-year old daughter, and it awarded him $10,000 for
emotional distress. See Legal Issues: Man gets $108,000 from Fertility Clinic for Breach of
Contract,HEALTH INS. L. WKLY., Feb. 22, 2004, at 41.
221. See Lisa Belkin, The Made-to-Order Savior: Producing a Perfect Baby Sibling, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2001, § 6, at 36, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/01/magazine
/01FANCONl.html (quoting Susan M. Wolf, Professor of Law and Medicine, University of
Minnesota).
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technology 222 increasingly encourage prospective parents to see the baby
as a product. Here too choices proliferate. 2 3
The marketplace for reproductive options, much as the marketplace
for shampoo, furniture, cars, or eateries, operates by presenting a variety
of choices and, at any point in time, defining one choice as more
fulfilling, more real, more satisfying than the others. The one appropriate
choice, however, changes quickly.224 Advertisements rely on and
illustrate this dynamic. 225 Consumers are presented with a new form of
shampoo or a new automobile model. Accompanying images suggest
that use of the product will change the user's everyday life by making
that person attractive and competent. When the product-the shampoo,
the car, the toothpaste--does not, in fact, produce those ends, a "new,
improved" version is available to be tried.226
Reproductive
technology
is being
marketed
similarly.
Advertisements for IVF and other reproductive technologies appeal to
the potential buyer's sense of incompleteness and incompetence. The
advertisements suggest that everyday life will be rendered joyful and the
buyer attractive and competent, if the clinic or provider's advertized
offer is accepted. A search on Google.com leads to a panoply of
illustrative presentations on various infertility clinics' websites. Only a
few examples, randomly selected, are described here; many others exist.
Fertility Neighborhood, labeled on its website as a Service of Freedom

222. This combination is referred to as "reprogenetics." See, e.g., Dana Ziker, Appropriate
Aims: Setting Boundariesfor Reprogenetic Technology, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 11.
223. For several decades, chromosomal testing during pregnancy has routinely been used to
allow women to abort babies suffering from a variety of chromosomal conditions, including Down's
Syndrome. More recently, prospective parents have relied on pre-implantation genetic diagnosis for
a variety of purposes. Some have used the process to select embryos of only one gender. See
Editorial, Choosing the Sex of Your Baby, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at § 4, at 12. Others have
used the process to select against embryos diagnosed with a variety of genetic alterations linked
with illness or disability. In 2002, the Journal of the American Medical Association considered the
case of a thirty-year old woman with a gene for early-onset Alzheimer's. Anxious to have a child
free of the gene (likely to result in Alzheimer's by age forty), the woman relied on preimplantation
genetic diagnosis to select against the genetic alteration. See generally Jerome Groopman,
Designing Babies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2002, at A14.
224. See STEVE BARNETT & MARTIN G. SILVERMAN, IDEOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 66
(1979) (describing "[e]veryday life" as "the domain of the substitution of one element for another
within limited universes of meaning (e.g., our supposed choices among toothpastes, cars, fashions,
modes of leisure, etc.)).
225. See HENRI LEFEBVRE, EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE MODERN WORLD (Sacha Rabinovitch,
trans., 1971) (asserting that "ideology of consumption is based" on "the advertizing ideology").
226. Id. at 104-09 (symbolizing the operation of advertisements thusly: "'Be a well-groomed
man. Every morning become a tremendous guy who appeals to himself and to women. Use this
After-Shave, or you will be nobody and know it .
I..'
Id. at 106-07.).
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Drug and Priority Health care, offers a link to "Treatment Options. 22 7
The link presents several additional options: "Medications for Infertility;
Procedures for Women; Procedures for Men; Assisted Reproductive
Technology; Lifestyle & Emotions; Choosing a Clinic; Choosing a
Pharmacy." Clicking on any one of the seven brings one to another long
list of links; clicking on any of these, in turn, produces a registration
form that enables one to become a member of Fertility Neighborhood.22 8
Abington Reproductive Medicine is described on its website as
proud of providing "close, caring relationships ...with our patients" and
as offering "cost-effective and cost-conscious care, without sacrificing
personalized attention., 229 A link presenting "patient comments" is
punctuated by photographs of attractive young couples and one woman
alone (perhaps pregnant). One patient thanks the doctor who treated her
and her husband for a "second chance." 230 She explains:
It is by no small act of fate that less than six months [after arriving at
your office, my husband] and I are expecting our first child. You and
your office helped create this miracle. You are a credit to your
profession. In a time where [sic] medical malpractice has risen to scary
heights, it is comforting to know that there are doctors like you who
still realize that 23
successful results come from truly caring and listening
to your patients.
Another patient reported that she had "given up hope" until she became
pregnant at the clinic:
In your office, the doctors were accessible, and spent long hours
making me feel that I deserved the number of children I wanted, while
the nurses supported my moods, answered my questions, and were
genuinely thrilled when we saw our twins on the ultrasounds. One year
later, we still feel a part of your practice with our232
own little miracles,
and that your practice remains a part of our family.
The promise reflected in these comments is of self-worth and
fulfillment at the level of everyday (family) life. The promise described

227.
228.

Fertility Neighborhood, http://www.fertilityneighborhood.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
Membership is billed as providing "free access to medical experts," "a supportive

community," and "helpful articles that explain infertility and its treatment." Id. (follow "Join Now"
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
229. Abington Reproductive Medicine, http://www.abington-repromed.com/ourpractice
/ourphilosophy.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
230.

Id. at http://abington-repromed.com/ourpractice/patient-comments3.html

(last visited

Nov. 5, 2005).
231.

Id.

232. http://www.abington-repromed.com/comments.html (visited Jan. 5, 2004).
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in the patients' comments is actualized through a business arrangement
between patients and the clinic. The statements quoted and other patient
comments on the website reflect a combination of market forces 233 and
family sentiment that characterizes involvement in infertility care for
many patients. The patients' comments blur the boundary between
commerce and family. Presumably designed to compete successfully in
the marketplace of infertility care by enticing new patients to use the
clinic, the presentation defines the relation between patient and clinic
(buyer and seller) in language that suggests friendship and family. For
instance, the patient who describes the clinic's practice as "part of our
family" expressly conflates a family created through the birth of what
she refers to as her "own little miracles" with her relationship to the
clinic.234
Other clinics' websites resemble advertisements for spas, fitness
centers, and bucolic vacations. The homepage of the website of the
Arizona Center for Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility, for
instance, is headed by a picture of daisies, partially covered by the
words: "Helping You to Achieve Your Dreams!, 235 Infertility, the site
explains, "can create [e]motional, [p]hysical, & [f]inancial hardships. 3 6
The clinic promises to dissipate each hardship.23 7

233. Abington Reproductive Medicine's website includes links to a newsletter, "Reproductive
Medicine Matters." The summer 2005 issue announced a program allowing qualified patients to
receive a seventy-percent discount if treatment (including three IVF cycles) is "unsuccessful."
Shared Risk IVF Treatment Refund ProgramNow Available to Patients, REPROD. MED. MATTERS
(Abington Reproductive Medicine), Summer 2005, at 1, available at http://www.abingtonrepromed.com/newsletter/pdfs/summer05NL.pdf.
234. See supra note 232.
235. Arizona Center for Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility, http://www.infertilityazctr.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
236. Id. This site also presents a second theme present on many of the websites describing
infertility treatments-the power of science. Arcane terms are defined; reproductive procedures are
explained, and success is described. See generally Institute for Reproductive Health, http:
www.cinncinnatifertility.com (last visited Jan. 5, 2004); Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine,
http://www.jonesinstitute.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
Describing themselves through the language of advertising, infertility clinics stress the
panoply of treatment choices available to patients. For instance, the website of the Arizona Center
for Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility describes eleven forms of treatment for infertility,
including intrauterine insemination, ovarian stimulation, IVF and embryo transfer, and
intracytoplasmic sperm injection. Arizona Center for Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility,
http://www.infertility-azctr.com/art.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2004). Other methods listed are:
gamete intrafallopian transfer, gender selection, testicular biopsy, assisted hatching,
preiimplantation genetic diagnosis, gamete donation, and cryopreservation of sperm, embryos, and
oocytes. Id.
237. The clinic's care is described as "cost-effective." Moreover, the clinic promises to
"creat[e] a well informed patient" so that "a successful partnership is forged." Finally, the website
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Contrasting images of infertility treatment abound in stories told by
unsuccessful patients and many academic commentaries. 238 The Brts
British
anthropologist Sarah Franklin writes that "[a]lthough ART's are often
celebrated as an expansion of reproductive choice, all the women
interviewed for this study described not having any choice-they 'had to
try' IVF.,, 239 Franklin, who did anthropological fieldwork in an IVF
clinic in Britain, contrasts media depictions of IVF with the experiences
of women going through the process:
In contrast to the extensive media depiction of women choosing IVF
because they are "desperate" for a child, this study found that women
were in fact often already resigned to the likelihood of not having
children before undergoing IVF ....Ironically, it is the experience of
undertaking IVF that may produce the240very "desperateness" that it is
often represented as helping to relieve.
Thus, the IVF industry also resembles the larger commercial
marketplace in attempting to create a need it then presents itself as able
to satisfy.
At least as troubling to many bioethicists as the market in infertility
treatment is the developing panoply of choices-in-babies offered to
infertility patients. 241 Prospective parents are selecting for and against
traits that will characterize their children. 242 Infertile couples have
stresses the importance of "an open and ethical relationship" between the clinic and each patient."
Arizona Center for Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility, supranote 235.
238. See supra note 218 (describing Elizabeth Bartholet's description of her decision to stop
infertility treatment).
239. Sarah Franklin, Making Miracles: Scientific Progress and the Facts of Life in
REPRODUCING REPRODUCTION: KINSHIP, POWER, AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION

102, 107

(Sarah Franklin & Helena Ragond eds., 1998).
240. Id. at 112.
241. Leon Kass, former chair of President George W. Bush's Council on Bioethics describes
IVF and embryonic genetic testing as the beginning of a process that threatens to "transform[]
begetting into making" and "procreation into manufacture." LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE
DEFENSE OF DIGNITY 201-02 (2002). He sees cloning as a frightening extension of the process:
With cloning, not only is the process in hand, but the total genetic blueprint of the cloned
individual is selected and determined by the human artisans. To be sure, subsequent
development is still according to natural processes, and the resulting children will be
recognizably human. But we would be taking a major step into making man himself
simply another one of the manmade things.
Id. at 201-02. Kass differentiates cloning from other forms of reproductive technology in that with
cloning "we give existence to a being not by what we are, but by what we intend and design." Id. at
202.
242. At present, cloning represents the extreme edge of prenatal selection. Leon Kass locates
what he takes to be the essential problem with cloning: It is not that the cloned child is produced
with the assistance of technology. Rather, the problem for Kass is that the cloned child, produced as
the result of "human design," is inferior to the one who designed the child:
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advertised for tall ova donors with SAT scores of at least 1400.243
Gender selection is another option available to prospective parents. 2 "
Moreover, through preimplantation genetic diagnosis or prenatal testing
followed by abortion if test results prove disappointing, it is possible to
select for or against a wide range of other traits. 245
The generalization of marketplace individualism is further evident
in the practice of infertility care insofar as it may involve third parties,
negotiated arrangements, and money exchange. Reliance on gamete
donors and surrogates reflects a form of interaction once viewed as
antithetical to the creation of the parent-child bond.24 6 Thus, assisted
reproduction suggests a shift in understandings of family relationships,

As with any product of our making, no matter how excellent, the artificer stands above
it, not as an equal but as a superior, transcending it by his will and creative prowess. In
human cloning, scientists and prospective "parents" adopt a technocratic attitude toward
human children, as their artifacts. Such an arrangement is profoundly dehumanizing, no
matter how good the product.
KASS, supra note 241, at 202.
Other commentators are less troubled than is Kass by the prospect of reprogenetics and
cloning. Professor Lee Silver wrote:
Advanced reproductive technologies will be used to provide infertile couples and
individuals with the opportunity to have biological children in the context of loving
families. Reprogenetic technologies will be used to provide children with increased
chances of physical and mental health and increased longevity. If standard medical
practice is followed, no technology will be applied until its safety and efficacy is
demonstrated ....If standard medical practice is followed, the benefits will outweigh
the risks.
Lee M. Silver, How Reprogenetics Will Transform the American Family, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649,
656-57 (1999).
A human has not yet been cloned, though human embryos have been. Advanced Cell
Technology, a Massachusetts biotechnology company, cloned a human embryo to the 16-cell stage.
Kristen Philipkoski, Human Clone Produces Stem Cells, Wired News, Feb. I1, 2004,
http://www.wired.com/news/0,1294,62254,00.html. Researchers in South Korea claimed to have
cloned human embryos from which they derived stem cells. Id.In December 2005, the head of the
South Korean group, Hwang Woo-suk, responded to accusations that he had falsified data. He
asserted that his findings were accurate but asked to have his research report withdrawn. The report
was published by the journal Science in May 2005. Kwang-Tae Kim, Seoul University Probes Stem
Cell Research, NEWSDAY, Dec. 18, 2005, available at http://www.newsday.com/news/health/snsap-stem-cell-accusations,0,249967.story.
243. See, e.g., Sege, supra note 217.
244. See, e.g., Belkin, supra note 221; Choosing the Sex of Your Baby, supra note 223.
245. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN MUNTHE, PURE SELECTION (1999) (considering the moral
dimensions of preimplantation genetic diagnosis); R. Ashcroft, Bach to the Future. Response to:
Extending PreimplantationGenetic Diagnosis: Medical and Non-Medical Uses, 29 J. MED. ETHICS
217 (2003), available at http://www.jmedethics.com. (considering medical and non-medical uses of
preimplantation genetic diagnosis).
246. See JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY 245-53 (1997) (summarizing
transformation of families in the United States in the second half of twentieth century and noting the
place of third-party participation in the reproductive process in that transformation).
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as it suggests a shift in understandings of the world of health care. This
is not accidental. Just as the last several decades of the twentieth century
witnessed an explicit transformation of the family away from a
hierarchically structured universe identified with unremitting loyalty, 247
so a similar shift has begun to transform the world of health care from
one essentially separate from the world of the commercial marketplace
to one increasingly hard to distinguish from the world of commerce.
V.

CONCLUSION

The three kinds of excesses described in this Article may be
unavoidable consequences of rules fashioned through the lens of an
ideology steadfastly committed to safeguarding autonomous
individuality. Yet, these excesses diminish the very benefits to patients
that the rules from which they flow were intended to effect.
The excesses described in this Article are likely to interfere with the
sort of physician-patient relationship most productive of good health
care. These excesses facilitate the construction of a health care system
that redefines patients as consumers and doctors as employeesaccountable to a complex assortment of commercial interests and state
administrators.
Shifts in the scope of the patient-provider relationship and in the
meaning of "patient" have been facilitated by what William Sage refers
to as the "lawyerization of medicine., 248 That process is not a first cause
of the ideological changes described in this Article. Rather it is a modus
vivendi for incorporating new understandings and values into the world
of health care. Nevertheless, it is now incumbent on lawmakers to serve,
once again, as a modus vivendi for change. This time, the task requires
lawmakers to tame the excesses that have flowed from earlier efforts to
safeguard patient autonomy. The aim is to temper the excesses without
sacrificing rules that protect autonomous individuality.
For instance, elaborations of the informed consent doctrine that
diminish physician authority without clearly enhancing patient welfare,
such as the requirement in Johnson that the physician inform a surgery
patient about the physician's own comparative inexperience, should not
be encouraged by lawmakers. 249 The rule in Johnson precludes the

247.
248.
(2001).
249.

Id.
William M. Sage, The Lawyerization of Medicine, 26 J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L. 1179
Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996); see supra notes 121-134 and

accompanying text.
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development of trust between patient and physician. Yet, trust seems to
play a central part in the healing relationship.25 °
Similarly, the value of providing people with information about
their future health risks must be balanced against the dangers inherent in
defining patients with reference to their DNA. Those dangers include the
social risk of conflating identity with genetic alterations and the
correlative risk of imagining genetic groups as undifferentiated wholes.
The New Jersey legislature recognized these risks and precluded their
most likely manifestations.25 1 Other states should follow that example.
Finally, the third excess delineated in this Article, the
generalization of autonomous individuality (illustrated through reference
to the creation of a commercial market in reproductive care) threatens
widely to re-shape the physician-patient relationship. Uses of
reproductive technology should be more consistently and carefully
regulated than is currently the case in the United States. 2 At present,
states lack comprehensive regulatory schemes that could provide for
infertility care, while precluding or at least limiting the
commercialization of such care. It is time that states respond to that
challenge.
None of these responses is dramatic. All are comparatively easy to
effect. They should be undertaken in order to safeguard the goals that, in
fact, underlie legal rules mandating respect for patient autonomy.

250. It should not be assumed that trust is inevitably a good thing, only that it can be and often
is a good thing. A number of commentators have noted that trust can be the basis for immoral as
well as moral relationships. See, e.g., Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 231-32
(1986). Trusting relationships may exclude some parties to their detriment, and trusting
relationships may, in effect, silence one party to the relationship in the name of "trust."
251. Genetic Privacy Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12 (West 1996).
252. Other countries now have comprehensive regulatory schemes, limiting and channeling the
uses of reproductive technology. See, e.g., Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA),
1948, SI 2004/1511 § 2 (U.K.). That legislation was enacted soon after the completion of the
Wamock Report in 1984. The report was named for Mary Warock, who headed the commission
(formed in 1982) that provided direction for the British Parliament in regulating reproductive
assistance. See MARY WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK REPORT ON HUMAN
FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (1984).
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